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Abstract
Safety-critical systems must always have predictable and reliable behavior, otherwise systems
fail and lives are put at risk. Even with the most rigorous testing it is impossible to test systems
using all possible inputs. Complex software systems will often fail when given novel sets of
inputs; thus, safety-critical systems may behave in unintended, dangerous ways when subject
to inputs combinations that were not seen in development. Safety critical systems are normally
designed to be fault tolerant so they do not fail when given unexpected inputs.
Anomaly detection has been proposed as a technique for improving the fault tolerance of
safety-critical systems. Past work, however, has been largely limited to behavioral parameter
thresholds that miss many kinds of system deviations. Here we propose a novel approach to
anomaly detection in fault-tolerant safety critical systems using patterns of messages between
threads. This approach is based on techniques originally developed for detecting security vio-
lations on systems with UNIX-like system call APIs; here we show that they can be adapted
to the constraints of safety critical microkernel-based hard real-time systems. We present the
design, implementation, and initial evaluation of tH (thread Homeostasis) implemented on a
QNX-based self-driving car platform.
1 Introduction
A safety-critical system is one that either directly or indirectly ensures the safety of its operators
and users. The correct function of these systems is critical and their failure to mitigate or control
a hazard could result in financial loss, injury, death, loss of vital equipment or damage to the
environment [3]. Safety-critical systems are pervasive in our everyday lives, from microwave ovens
to vehicles, planes, nuclear power stations, medical and space systems. With our increasing de-
pendence on such systems and their growing complexity, safety-critical software is becoming much
harder to develop while ensuring its correctness and safety [41].
Despite the highest level of standards used in developing safety critical systems, runtime errors
and bugs are never completely eliminated. Deficiencies in the software development process usually
get a fair share of the blame due several reasons including incorrect or incomplete requirements,
misleading specifications, poor design, miscommunication between teams and insufficient quality
assurance. No matter how careful a safety-critical system is designed and developed, mistakes are
made and errors are introduced along the way.
Given this reality, it is vital for a safety-critical system to have some form of error detection and
recovery capabilities to prevent latent software errors from becoming faults and causing hazards
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[34]. Such systems are known as fault-tolerant systems [3][27]. Several safety standards such as
ISO-26262 for automotive functional safety and DO-178C for airborne systems recommend the use
of some form of anomaly detection during the safety-critical system’s operational phase. Anomaly
detectors would enable a safety-critical system to detect errors and engage its fail-safe modes or
other error correction functions before errors become disastrous.
Much of the fault-detection research work focuses on detecting anomalies from individual compo-
nents that are elected to be most critical. Since most systems are composed of highly interconnected
components, we believe that in order to effectively detect faults, the system should be monitored as
a whole. Isolating specific processes or components might distort the view of what is actually hap-
pening. This could result in delaying an action that could have been taken at an earlier and more
appropriate stage and preventing an error from becoming a fault. Such a technique could prove to
be even more powerful on a message-passing microkernel where high interconnectivity between its
microservices is a core part of its design. An anomaly detector that monitors the behavior of the
entire system however, must have a negligible impact on the system’s performance and its ability
to fully achieve its functional requirements.
Using the safety-certified message-passing QNX microkernel, we implemented an adaptive anomaly
detector using a technique inspired by a detector first proposed by Forrest et al. [23]: short-
sequences of system calls. However, since most of the system calls on a QNX microkernel are
implemented using message passing, our anomaly detector builds behavioral profiles for system
processes using short-sequences of system calls and messages passed between a process and the
kernel and between a processes and another. We leverage the high interconnectivity and the dis-
tributed micro-architectural nature of processes running on a message-passing microkernel to our
advantage: the effects of a misbehaving process can be quickly seen throughout the entire system.
One key challenge for any adaptive anomaly detector is obtaining sufficient training data in
order to build a model that will produce few false positives. We take advantage of the fact that
safety-critical software is subjected to an excruciating level of testing and build behavioral profiles
during the verification phase. In production, profiles would be static and no learning would normally
occur.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Aa novel online anomaly detection method using short sequences of messages emitted by
individual processes’ threads. This work is an extension of the previous work of building
models using short-sequences of system calls emitted by processes [58] and detects behavioral
anomalies on a process thread-level. The design, implementation details and validation of
the proposed detection method along with the framework for collecting the required traces
at runtime are described.
• A lean and efficient mechanism to extract the information we need from a safety-critical
microkernel is implemented.
• Real-life self-driving car technology is used to evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology
for its ability to detect true positives with very low false-positive rates. We demonstrate that
our solution can be used in an embedded environment to monitor all the processes in the
system efficiently, requiring in our tests an average of 1.2% of the CPU resources and 4.5 MB
of memory on a highly active self-driving car system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines a high-level overview of the
software-engineering processes involved in developing fault-tolerant systems along with the defi-
ciencies found in the processes. This is followed by background material on anomaly-detection for
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safety-critical systems including the anomaly detector that this work is based on. In Section 4 we
argue our point-of-view for adopting behavioral-based anomaly detection for safety-critical systems
and explain the gap we found in the current research. We also introduce the design guidelines we
adopted for developing our anomaly detector and the rationale behind them. The design details
of our implementation are explained in Section 5 followed by an evaluation on a real production
system in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 has the discussion of the results, our conclusion and future
work.
2 Background
Simple errors in safety-critical software can have severe consequences. In June 1996 an Ariane 5
rocket exploded due to an overflow of a floating point to signed integer conversion [69]. In February
1991 a timing-based calculation error in a US Patriot missile-defense system resulted in an intercept
failure that resulted in killing 25 US soldiers and injuring 97 [26]. More recently in October 2018 a
Boeing 737 MAX dove into the Java sea off the coast of Indonesia, killing all 189 people on board
[59] due to a misbehaving flight computer.
Safety-critical systems are designed, implemented, and evaluated to try and prevent such
tragedies. Safety requirements affect the system’s requirements by defining the hazards that must
be avoided and ones that must be handled during the operation of the final product [45]. Safety
analysis techniques such as functional hazard assessment, fault tree analysis and failure mode effects
analysis are some of the most prominent and proven techniques in the field [70].
Fault-tolerant systems attempt to mitigate potential failures arising from design, implementata-
tion, and testing errors or omissions using a variety of techniques. Software Fault Prediction (SFP)
uses machine learning techniques to build models that can be used to predict potential and fault
prone software modules in the early stages of the development life cycle [46]. N-Version program-
ming runs multiple, independently-developed versions of the same software in parallel, with faulty
modules being detected in real time via conflicting outputs [3, 49]. Lockstepping can mitigate errors
by running software or hardware in tandem, synchronous operations [33, 32]. Fault-Containment
Regions, areas on the system to isolate safety and non-safety critical components, prevent faults
from migrating between the different critical regions [3, 37, 37]. High-assurance backup systems
mitigate failures through the use of a trimmed-down, highly trusted backup system that can take
over when the primary module exhibits problems [11, 3, 55, 9].
Anomaly detection has been used extensively in fault-tolerant safety critical systems [51] and
such work spans multiple disciplines such as chemical, nuclear and aerospace engineering [30].
Anomalies can be classified in two categories; point anomalies and contextual anomalies [27]. Point
anomalies are specific data points that are outliers with respect to the rest of the data. Contextual
anomaly detectors use behavioral and contextual attributes in order to detect anomalous behav-
ior. Most anomaly detection research in safety-critical systems is directed towards detecting point
anomalies [16].
Anomaly detectors can either be online or offline. Online anomaly detectors build a model
they believe best represents the system’s behavior from various predetermined sources during the
system’s execution. This model is continuously updated with the runtime data as the system is
executing, using efficient online algorithms [36]. Once the model is ready for use, deviations from
this model are marked as anomalies and can be used to raise alarms as the system runs. On the
other hand, offline detectors require all the data generated during the system’s execution to be
presently available in order to build their models and detect anomalies. Offline detectors such as
SiPTA [73] have the advantage of executing on machines that are more powerful than the typical
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low to moderate power embedded systems.
Salem et al. [54] presented an offline behavioral anomaly detector to analyse discrete process
event trace data generated by an operating system kernel. Their work relies on the fact that
embedded systems typically have recurrent behavior. They propose a technique, inter-arrival curves,
which is based on arrival-curves to extract high-level features and build a training model. The
model uses the upper and lower bounds to the number of events that can occur within a specified
time period to represent system behavior. During the training phase, event curves are generated
per trace and then aggregated to provide input into a two-stage curve classifier that detects and
measures the deviation from the training model. During testing time (offline), the inter-arrival
curves from the trace data are generated and the classifier is used to detect whether the traces are
anomalous.
Offline detectors are not suitable for all use cases; they suffer from some issues that might
make them less ideal than their online counterpart. They require an extensive amount of data
from previously executed system runs which might not be feasible in some use cases, especially
those where the operating environment of the system changes frequently. Some offline detectors
run post-mortem (after the system has finished execution), or remotely, on a different machine.
This is another major limiting factor as it prohibits them from raising alarms as bugs occur in real
time [21]. Raising alarms as bugs occur in real time is necessary for detecting anomalies before
they become major failures. Offline systems usually do not have the flexibility of updating their
models on-the-fly, at runtime, if new system behavior needs to be incorporated in its model of
normal behavior.
Much of the literature on anomaly detection for safety-critical systems revolves around error
detection in data collected from hardware components such as sensors and other key system compo-
nents. This data is usually collected non-invasively, using components external to the core system
or via embedded event tracing facilities. A model is built and different methods are then used to
analyse the model and detect outliers or events that do not conform to the general pattern in the
model. Gosh et al. [25] built a finite state automaton-based model to represent the behavior of
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) used in manufacturing control. They use simple events,
such as the boolean status of signals. The model, which is a simple set of state transition rules,
is built using captured data from what they believe to be a fault-free manufacturing system. At
runtime, the model is used to detect two types of behavioral anomalies: errors occurring in state
transitions and errors that occur in the duration of those transitions. Chen et al. [17] developed
a hardware module that detects anomalies in unmanned aerial vehicles at runtime. Their anomaly
detector is based on the common supervised learning algorithm, least-squares support vector ma-
chine (LS-SVM). They use LS-SVM to predict and classify flight data generated from key sensors
and components into anomalous and normal groups at runtime. Liu et al. pre-process continuous
and discrete flight data then convert them into discrete sequences [42]. Each sequence is further
divided into smaller subsequences upon which variable length n-grams are obtained. The Unique
n-grams are identified and used as the feature space for the training data-set. Each subsequence is
an input feature vector to a one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM). The learnt classifier is then
used to detect anomalous flight data in realtime.
Bovenzi et al. propose using online statistical analysis at an OS level to detect anomalous user-
level processes. Their solution does not have a training or profiling phase to understand how the
system is expected to behave. They use indicators such as system call errors, disk I/O timeouts,
process scheduling delays and time to acquire semaphores [12]. The indicators are collected at
regular intervals and the time series is analysed for anomalies based on the computation of upper
and lower thresholds. Suspicious changes in the features of their model are considered to be a result
of a fault activation. They base their analysis on injected faults at runtime and show that their
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algorithm can detect the breach of their calculated upper and lower threshold ranges (as well as
global threshold). They then assume that this “anomaly” is a result of an activation of a fault and
is not part of the normal system behavior.
Several operating system reliability techniques are based on detecting system hangs or delays,
be it the operating system or applications running atop. These methods are often concerned
with the liveness property of a system versus its correctness. A hang condition can be either a
result of infinite loops, also known as active hangs, or a result of permanent or extended wait
conditions, known as passive hangs [15]. Irrera et al. [31] argue that critical systems are too
complex and have highly non-deterministic behavior that renders online fault detection for safety-
critical systems too difficult of a task. This non-determinism is the result of multiple factors such
as multi-threading and the use of shared resources. This can cause a safety-critical application to
hang, and hence their development of an application hang detector. They model normal behavior
through various operating system parameters, namely system calls, OS signals, scheduling timeout,
waiting times on semaphores, holding times for critical sections, processes and threads exit codes,
and I/O throughput. For each of the monitored events, they associate pre-configured upper and
lower threshold values which they determine from a training phase. At runtime, if an event deviates
above or below the threshold within a given specified temporal window, an alarm is raised. Wang et
al. [71] developed a framework for runtime system hang detection and application checkpointing.
One of the functions of their kernel module is to detect hangs in the operating system and its
applications in order to provide a low-latency error detection and recovery mechanism. Their work
relies on using various CPU debugging facilities and counters to non-invasively 1 instrument the
operating system. An example of one such instrumentation is keeping track of a process context
switching frequency; a breakpoint is set to trap on the kernel’s scheduling entry point and their
profiling work is performed in their custom exception handler when the generated software exception
is raised. Some instrumented values are profiled in order to provide more accurate thresholds before
assuming a hang condition. Their related works section provides an excellent list of similar solutions
in both academia and industry.
While these reliability techniques have merit for certain use cases, for example in systems were
high-availability is required, we believe that they cannot be the sole fault-tolerance technique in a
system. Without doubt, system hangs represent a critical system failure, but they are merely one
type of failure that could possibly occur. We also argue that reaching a state where the system
has already hung, is a late stage if not a final one in the fault-detection life cycle. Such solutions
are not suitable for all the complex operating environments that systems could be subjected to.
For those, as we have argued earlier, a holistic view of the system’s behavior must be taken into
account. We would rather have a system revert to its design or fail-safe state if it is performing
the incorrect function or misbehaving than have a lively system that never hangs but executes
erroneously. Furthermore, in some cases, the hang detection algorithms require a pre-determined
threshold that is tuned during the training phase such as the work by Carrozza et al. [15]. This
is not very well suited for systems with highly dynamic environments and might require adaptive
threshold techniques like the one presented by Bovenzi et al. [13].
Program control flow is considered to be a powerful indicator of normal behavior that can be
leveraged to detect behavioral anomalies and software bugs. Argus [21], an online bug detection
tool, collects samples of pre-determined events that best represent the normal control-flow behavior
of programs at runtime. Using the samples, an extended finite state automaton is used as a model
of the programs’ normal control flow. Each state in the ext-FSA, represents an event and the
transitions between them are augmented with the distribution of their transition frequency. During
1In their opinion. Our opinion differs.
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detection time, a window of a fixed size is slid over the generated control-flow events and the contents
of the window are then checked against the model raising an alarm if a certain threshold is crossed.
In Lorenzoli et al.’s work, a more detailed model is automatically generated in an attempt to fully
capture the behavior of software using an ext-FSA [43]. The ext-FSA uses both the constraints on
the data as well as the interaction between components via method invocations. The relationship
between them is also incorporated in the model.
Huang, H. et al. created a runtime error detector for avionics software using the common
machine learning clustering technique, K-means [29]. The detector collects data from carefully
hand-selected program variables such as aircraft altitude and vertical velocity during testing. A set
of time-series signals is built from the collected events. Features and clusters are then extracted
from the time-series signals. Using logistic regression, a fault-probability model is generated and an
alarm is raised if the probability that certain data is erroneous exceeds a predetermined threshold.
Their binary classifier was tested using a normally behaving autopilot simulator and another with
two injected faults: an integer overflow and a unit conversion error.
Even though it is an offline diagnostic tool, Chopstix [10] attracted our attention. Chopstix is
an offline diagnostic tool developed primarily for production systems. With a very low overhead,
Chopstix continuously collects system-level events that it believes best describe the behavior of the
entire system. Events such as CPU utilization, L2 Cache misses, page allocation and scheduling
delays are logged at a very high frequency using a probabilistic data structure along with detailed
contextual information. A human operator can then use Chopstix to analyse misbehavior. Chopstix
uses a predefined set of rules in order to correlate anomalies and uncover the root cause before
they become major system faults. Chopstix has a few commonalities with our proposed anomaly
detector: i) it uses low-level operating system events for detecting behavioral anomalies; ii) it stores
the events in a compact efficient manner with a very low CPU overhead (less than 1%).
Langer et al. propose two methods for anomaly-based error detection. In [38], the Angluin
learner is used to infer a minimal deterministic finite state automation (DFA) that represents the
normal behavior of a distributed system. They claim that the system states and control flow are
directly correlated to its communication behavior and use network trace data to build a DFA.
They show that in theory and by using synthesized trace data, detecting anomalies using this
technique works very well. However, they could not conclude the same using real-world data since
it was more complex that expected. The DFA is built using data generated during the testing
phase. This closely aligns with our philosophy. Based on the exhaustive testing any safety-critical
system is expected to be subjected to, they assume that the normal behavior of a system during its
operational phase should not be different than any of its verification test cases. Thus, generating
the model of normal behavior during the final product testing should be enough. Langer et al.
made an attempt to train an artificial neural network (ANN) on the discrete events generated by
a distributed system’s network traffic [39]. The ANN is then used to forecast message sequences,
comparing its prediction to the values generated at runtime. Deviations in the predicted versus
actual values allows them to detect behavioral anomalies in the internal state of the software
generating this traffic. Their choice of using an ANN comes from the fact that other mathematical
models cannot fully cover the behavior of complex systems that exhibit discontinuous behavior
or that the model would be infeasible to calculate. Again, this work has great similarity to ours;
the messages being sent on a network are directly correlated to the internal state of the software
sending or receiving them. A deviation from the normal traffic is used to indicate an anomaly in the
system’s behavior. Considering that our work is based on a message-passing system, our anomaly
detector also builds a behavioral model out of the messages being sent and received by processes,
be it kernel calls or others. It is worth noting that Langer et al. have also proposed using their
anomaly detector to detect the lack of testing during the product verification phase in order to
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detect missed test cases [40]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only literature other than
ours that makes such a proposal.
Fault screeners are simple algorithms that detect errors in data based on unary program invari-
ant [20] checking [4]. Systems that are exposed to radiation, such as space systems, have a higher
probability of hardware failure due to single-event upsets. Racunas et al. propose a fault screener
as the processor fault-tolerance algorithm to handle such events [52]. The static instructions gener-
ated by a process and their expected valid values are used to learn program behavior. They show
that consistent upper and lower bounds can be calculated for the valid value space and show that
these bounds are violated in the presence of a fault or abnormal program behavior. Abreu et al.
[4] investigated and compared the use of several fault screeners: Bloom filters, bitmask and range
screeners.
One of the techniques that had a common occurrence in the literature was the use of Markov
models. Baah et al. built an offline anomaly detector that can detect faults at runtime using a
fully observable Markov model [8]. The model is built during a training phase and its parameters
are estimated using the Baum-Welch algorithm. During training, the program to be monitored is
instrumented to collect predicate information and the results collected during a test suite execution.
The predicates are then translated into states which represent some of the program semantics and
capture its behavior. The generated states are then used as an input to a clustering algorithm and
the unique clusters are used to represent states in the Markov model. During detection time, if
the probabilities of state transitions exceed a pre-computed threshold, an alarm is raised. Bowring
et al. use the sequence of method calls and program branches as features for a Markov model
representing program behavior [14]. In order to create an aggregate representation of a program’s
executions, they devised a technique to cluster Markov models of a program’s executions and create
Markov model-based classifiers that model a collection of the program’s executions. The classifiers
are enhanced using an incremental active learning technique and the classifier is applied to a set
of unlabeled program execution data. The outputted labeled data is then used as an input to the
classifier in the next stage or increment, thus retraining the classifier.
Lu et al. built a behavioral model from various system timing measures such as instruction
and data cache mistimings, interrupt service routines, system and function calls and various other
software execution timings [44]. They used three separate classification-based anomaly detection
methods: i) a range-based classifier that utilizes the upper and lower bounds of executions times,
ii) a distance-based classifier that creates a three dimensional sphere from timing data and uses
the Euclidean distance to the sphere’s center compared with the sphere’s boundary as a measure
of anomaly, iii) a one-class SVM that defines a normal class for timing data. They implemented
their detector on a hardware module that taps into the processor’s trace port.
Yoon et al. tackle the safety and security of industrial plant control systems [72]. Using the
Gaussian Kernel Density estimation, they created a statistical learning-based intrusion detection
mechanism based on software execution times. They utilize the multicore nature of realtime em-
bedded systems and use one of the cores to monitor the other. A hardware Timing Trace Model
(TTM) is used to monitor a specific application for deviations in runtime execution signatures. In
case of an anomaly, the monitoring core takes control of the system to ensure an uninterrupted
error and fault free execution (fault-tolerance). The software being monitored is modified to add a
special trace instruction at various locations around code blocks. When the TTM receives a specific
trace instruction from the monitored core it reads some of its processor state, the timestamp and
the program counters are well as the process identifier of the executing task. The non-parametric
probability density estimation function of execution times is estimated using the Kernel Density
Estimation method with a Gaussian kernel function.
Non-intrusively, Moreno et al. introduce a novel runtime monitoring technique based on power
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consumption analysis of a CPU for anomaly detection [48]. They employ signal processing tech-
niques for signal pattern recognition for classifying system behavior and detecting program anoma-
lies. The core principal is that a CPU generates a unique power consumption profile when execut-
ing different software loads. This power profile can be detected using external monitoring devices.
Anomalous behavior or perturbations in the running software causes a deviation from this power
consumption profile that can be easily detected at runtime. This work is one of the few that closely
matches our idea of behavioral anomaly detection. No specific program features or variables were
selected to build an understanding of normal behavior, rather, the resulting outcomes and effects
a running system has from an outside observer’s perspective: an external device monitoring power
consumption in their case and a trusted entity (the kernel) monitoring emitted messages and kernel
calls.
3 Process Homeostasis
Process Homeostasis, or pH, is the name of a real-time host-based anomaly detection and response
prototype developed by Somyaji A. as part of his PhD dissertation [58]. pH employs a simple,
yet powerful heuristic to detect diversions in a program’s normal behavior utilizing short-sequences
of system calls that was first introduced by Forrest et al. as a profiling technique [23]. The
prototype developed for this thesis is based on the same core principal.
3.0.1 Process Homeostasis and Immunological Basis
Process homeostasis refers to the biological organism’s ability to maintain a stable internal envi-
ronment suitable for the organism’s ideal functioning [58]. The destruction of foreign pathogens,
the constant monitoring and correction of temperature, acidity and other chemical imbalances are
all part of an organism’s homeostatic nature [58].
The natural immune system plays a vital role in protecting animals from harmful pathogens.
The immune system is capable of generating detectors such as T cells, B cells and antibodies
by which it distinguishes the body’s own cells from foreign ones [22]. Once an antigen has been
recognized, the detector cells bind to it, thus signaling the start of a destruction process via general
purpose scavenger cells. To recognize a pathogen, the immune system’s detectors bind to short-
sequences of proteins or peptides found in the pathogen. The binding regions on the detector cells
are generated through a pseudo-random genetic process. The detector cells that could bind to the
body’s own cells (autoimmune disease) are eliminated [22].
pH attempts to mimic how the biological immune system works by giving the system a sense of
self or the ability to distinguish between the system’s self and non-self. Such separation enables pH
to maintain a homeostatic and stable system. Once pH defines the system under normal operating
conditions, it is capable of detecting any foreign activity or anything that is non-self. This powerful
biological technique enables the immune system to defend against foreign bodies that it hasn’t seen
before or hasn’t previously encountered their signature. The definition of self cannot be too specific,
or too narrow, that the immune system would mistakenly identify variants of itself as foreign. It
also cannot be too general that it would allow infections to go unnoticed.
Forrest et al. [24] deduced important properties from the natural immune system that a security
system must have in order to be effective. First, just like the immune system, detection must
be distributed over multiple sites; detection is not localized to one part of the body. Similarly,
for software ecosystems, detection must be spread across the entire system as well. Different
running copies of software on the same local system, as well as software running on interconnected
systems must have multiple detection mechanisms. Furthermore, these detection mechanisms must
8
be unique to each running instance of software. This diversity allows a more powerful localized
detection mechanism and prevents a single vulnerability from compromising the entire system or
a network of systems. Second, the immune system utilizes multiple detectors each with their own
input in the decision making process, thus detection is probabilistic. This greatly decreases the
misclassification of legitimate events (false-positives) in the system as a whole, on the account of
reducing the detection rate of malicious activity in local sites. Lastly, the probabilistic nature of
the immune system’s detection enables it to recognize foreign objects that it has not encountered
previously. This would allow a security system to detect zero-day vulnerability.
Forrest et al. [23] showed that short-range, temporarily-ordered sequence of system calls (mod-
eled after peptides [22]) can be used as a reliable fingerprint of processes’ normal behavior. They
showed that the fingerprint uniquely identifies system processes, has low variance and most im-
portantly, sequences generated by an ill-behaving process can be easily and efficiently identified
at runtime when comparing to a baseline sequence. The short-range sequence of system calls are
those invoked during the normal operation of a process and are only a subset of all the possible
permutations of system calls found in the program’s source code. A profile of normal behavior must
withstand variations under normal operating conditions and hence be resilient to false-positives.
At the same time the profile should be easily disturbed by real intrusions in order to have a high
detection rate [28].
pH defines a system’s self by building a profile of normal behavior for each process in the system.
Naturally and by definition, a system’s self is the manifestation of its normal behavior. The normal
profile is built using the type and relative order of system calls issued by a process. Using system
calls allows pH to observe process behavior without knowing its internals or implementation details.
pH treats the running instance of program code as a black box emitting observable data and employs
only one type of detector and effector [28], an abnormal system call detector and an effector that
delays anomalous ones [58].
It is important to differentiate between a process’ normal behavior, legal behavior and all pos-
sible behavior. Normal behavior is all behavior seen when a process is operating under its normal,
intended operating conditions, i.e., the software’s primary function. Legal behavior is all normal
behavior in addition to exceptions that might potentially occur during normal operation, for exam-
ple, low disk space or a missing file. All possible behavior encompasses legal and normal behaviors
in addition to all possible branches and illegal paths that the software could potentially take. This
is due to imperfections in code and/or hardware and includes exploited vulnerabilities such as buffer
overflows and hardware faults [58]. Given this definition, pH observes normal program behavior
under the assumption that normal program behavior is almost always safe program behavior [58].
One evident problem with pH is the difficulty of defining self, given the dynamic nature of
systems, without having to modify that definition later on. Consider a system where profiles of
normal behavior have been established; what then, if a new program was installed? Without the
ability to modify the definition of the normal behavior, the newly installed program and the changes
in behavior it creates in the system will be wrongfully flagged as foreign or anomalous. pH handles
this problem by allowing the system’s profiles to be modified at runtime.
3.0.2 Overview
pH is implemented as a patch to the Linux kernel and has three main parts: a utility to trace system
calls invoked by all processes on the system, a utility to analyze the traced system calls, and a utility
to react to anomalies by slowing down the invocation of the offending call. pH sits between user
space processes and the kernel right at the system call entry point in the kernel. System calls are
a critical component to software running on any operating system. System calls are a predefined
9
Figure 1: Training and testing overview.
set of function calls used by processes to interact with the kernel in order to perform functions
that the process itself does not have the privilege or ability to perform, such as allocating system
memory, opening a file or communicating with hardware. System calls are implemented through
a pre-defined software interrupt that traps into the kernel and is serviced by a privileged (Ring 0)
routine.
Monitoring a process at the system call level does not detect or prevent corruptions within the
process itself, for example, a buffer overflow attempting to change the result of a calculation within
the process’ own address-space. However, if a vulnerability, or an error in the process were to cause
any kind of system-wide malicious activity, such as spawning a root shell or sending a command
to another driver or another critical system-level component, it would certainly need to interface
with the kernel by invoking system calls.
pH starts in training or learning mode. It builds a profile of system call sequences collected under
normal operating conditions. A profile exists per monitored process. pH monitors all processes on
the system. Once pH decides that it has seen enough system calls and that it has adequate
information that enables it to start detecting anomalous system calls sequences, it locks the profile
down, creates a copy and switches into detection or testing mode. In testing mode, if an anomaly
is detected, pH delays the offending system call by putting the invoking process to sleep for a
calculated amount of time. Both the original and the copied profiles are stored on disk and loaded
into kernel memory on process execution. Figure 1 shows an overview of the process.
3.0.3 Training Phase
During pH’s training phase, pH builds a compact structure that represents a generalization of all
the system calls observed per monitored process by using a simple heuristic called the lookahead
pairs method. pH’s designer has set a few constraints on the method to be used. Primarily, the
method should be able to:
• Converge as fast as possible at a fixed state during training phase.
• Efficiently determine the membership of patterns during the detection phase.
• Capture different and unique system call types with an acceptable limit on the size of gener-
ated data.
• Permit fast and incremental updates.
• Detect anomalous events that occur with low-frequency.
• Run high speed with a low and acceptable performance overhead.
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Figure 2: A sliding window over the system call sequence.
As shown in figure 2, a window of a pre-determined size is slid across the system call sequence.
For the calls found within the same window, pH records which system calls come before the one
currently being invoked and at which position. This is implemented as a circular buffer of size
(window length + 1) that gets updated every time a system call is invoked.
A two-dimensional N-by-N table (shown in 3), where N is the number of discrete system calls in
the system, is used to store the relative positions of the calls. Each cell in the table contains a one
dimensional array representing the sliding window of a fixed size. The rows of the table represent
the current call being invoked and the columns represent the previous calls. Their intersection
yields the one dimensional array that indicates the relative positions between the current and all
previous system calls that have occurred in the past. Specifically, “window-size” previous system
calls.
To give an example of how the table is updated, Figure 5 shows a sample sequence (open,
read, mmap, mmap, open, getrlimit, mmap, read, read, write, fork, close) with a window size of
eight. The first open call is inserted into the circular buffer and causes no update since it is the
only element in the buffer. Next, read is inserted. This causes pH to iterate through the circular
buffer starting from the element that precedes the current one, i.e open. Next, the row indexing
the current system call or “read” is selected along with the column indexing the previous call or
“open”. The intersection yields an array of size eight (the window size) that needs to be updated
with open’s relative position to the current read call within the window. Since open is the first
system call preceding read, the first position in the window is marked.
The third mmap call causes the mmap row and the read column to be updated at position one.
As well, it causes the mmap row and the open column to be updated at position two (since open
is two positions away from mmap within the window). This same operation is repeated as more
system calls are invoked. Skipping ahead to the ninth invocation of read, the read row is updated
at columns read, mmap, getrlimit, open, mmap, mmap, read and open at positions 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
and 8 respectively.
To that extent, for any given window with size L and a current system call S, there are L - 1
pairs: { (S , S-1), (S, S-2), ... (S, S-L)} can be formed for any window given. The set of all unique
pairs form the compact model of behavior under normal operating conditions. The model serves
as an approximation or a generalization of how the program is expected to behave.
3.0.4 Termination of the Training Phase
Once pH is convinced that it has seen enough system calls that represent the process’ normal
behavior or is instructed to do so by the system administrator, a duplicate of the training data is
created. This copy is used at runtime during the detection phase to classify system call invocations
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Figure 3: An NxN table of windows of size 8.
whether they are benign or anomalous. The copy of the training profile will be referred to as the
testing profile from here on. pH then turns on a flag stating that this particular training profile
belonging to a program is complete, thus signaling the start of the detection phase for this program.
The testing profile is never directly updated by pH. Both the training and testing data are stored
in files on a permanent storage medium to persist across system reboots. Every program on the
system has (unless explicitly ignored) a pair of training and testing files.
In order for pH to autonomously terminate the training phase for an executable, a couple of
conditions must be met. pH must make this crucial decision with utmost care. A premature
termination of training can result in a high percentage of false-positives, since pH would not have
captured enough sequences to represent the program’s normal behavior. To determine stabilization
in training data, pH uses a simple heuristic that allows it to monitor the occurrence of new system
call sequences both in terms of system calls and in terms of unit time.
Figure 4 shows the flow chart of the heuristic. Two main measures are required for this decision:
1. A ratio of the number of consecutive calls ignored (last mod count in Figure 4) to the total
number of calls made (train count in figure 4). In other words, how many calls occurring in
sequence have been ignored and not added to the training data because they already exist
in relation to the total number of sequences ever seen. The count of ignored calls since the
profile was last updated would also indicate that the profile has not been updated for count
calls and hence frozen. If this ratio crosses a certain threshold, pH marks the training profile
as ’frozen’. The threshold is a configurable runtime parameter; by default, pH sets this value
to 4.
2. The amount of time the profile has been frozen. Every time a profile is marked as frozen, the
time stamp of the event is recorded. Once a preset amount of time has passed (a week by
default) the profile is marked as ’normal’
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train_count = 0
Handle incoming system call:
train_count++
Add to training data?
last_mod_count = 0
last_mod_count++
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No
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Yes
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Figure 4: last mod count keeps count of the number of system calls ignored. train count is the
total number of system calls ever seen for that process.13
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3.0.5 Detection Phase
On program startup, pH will attempt to locate its testing profile. If the file has already been loaded
in memory due to the same program being started before, pH will use the in-memory testing data.
Otherwise, pH will locate the file on disk and load it in memory. Since program behavior is being
profiled, it is important to note the distinction between a process and a program. A process is
the runtime manifestation of some program code; multiple instances of the same program code will
point to the same training data.
Similar to the training phase, incoming system calls are added to a circular buffer. On each
insertion, the compact testing data table (previously the training table) is checked for mismatches.
For a system call n inserted, the table at row n is checked for every call preceding it in the circular
buffer. Thus, for every call n preceded by a call m at position p, the table is checked at row n
and column m. The row and column intersection contains the relative position array, which in turn
is checked at position p for a true or false value. A call that has never been seen during training
within that particular window (or circular buffer) will result in window size - 1 mismatches.
3.0.6 Reaction Phase
pH reacts to anomalies by delaying the anomalous system call’s invocation, this includes the pro-
cesses’ ability to load new programs with the execve system call. The length of the delay is
calculated in proportion to the number of recently illegitimate calls and is meant to give the system
administrator the chance to evaluate whether this is the correct behavior and to delay the potential
attacker. The idea behind the proportional delays is that true security violations will generate more
illegitimate calls in succession, or very close to one another, thus, the more clustered the anomalies
are, the larger the delay. pH maintains a locality frame count or LFC to keep track of such clusters.
3.0.7 Tolerization and Sensitization
In order to help reduce the false positives in the field, pH implements two additional processes. If
pH detects more than anomaly limit anomalies at runtime pH decides that normalizing the process
was incorrect or perhaps pre-mature. pH accepts the behavior as normal or tolerizes it, cancels the
processes’ monitoring, and restarts its training.
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On the other hand, in order to prevent pH from automatically learning anomalous behavior
through tolerization, a threshold tolerize limit for the locality frame count (LFC) is set in place.
Since LFC is an indication of clustered anomalies, the likelihood that the anomalous sequence will
bring a true positive is high. If this threshold is ever exceeded, the profile’s training dataset is
deleted and all previously learned sequences are deleted.
4 System-Wide Behavioural-based Anomaly Detection: Rationale
and Design Principals
In this chapter we present our own opinion and argue the need for adopting behavioral-based
anomaly detection for fault-tolerant systems. After having reviewed the literature and presented
the state of the art in the field, we could clearly see the gap in the research and product development
that our solution fills. We also present the critical design guidelines that we adopt for our anomaly
detector and the rationale behind them.
4.1 The Need for Behavioral Anomaly Detection
Detecting behavioral anomalies can play a vital role in safety-critical software, in particular, de-
tecting deviations from what is believed to be normal behavior. Conventional methods of error
detection, such as assertion-based methods, are not enough for detecting errors at runtime. The
highly variable nature of the processes’ operational environments produce new relationships be-
tween system entities and program variables [29]. These new conditions might not have been
accounted for during development and verification, leaving bugs that do not violate the rules of
the program undetected [21]. Thus the need for fault detection mechanisms that could learn the
intended behavior of software instead of what has actually been implemented.
Faults do not have clear and concise signatures, due to the complex relationships between
components, some of which are off-the-shelf components. Failure signatures cannot be predicted.
Asserting specific conditions at runtime is important, however, runtime asserts alone are an incom-
plete method of being fault-tolerant. Software faults can be detected either explicitly, via detecting
a specific pattern that is known to be produced by a particular fault or implicitly, by detecting
an anomaly in a component that is indirectly linked [47]. Even though a safety-critical process
could appear to be behaving normally, an abnormally high CPU usage or a misbehaving sensor
driver can be an early indicator of a fault that is about to occur. Some faults cannot be detected
through explicit patterns and assertions; they can only be detected through recognizing anomalous
behaviour that does not match normal expectations.
As we have stated before, validating the correctness and completeness of the software specifi-
cations and requirements unto which the entire system is based is no trivial task. The software
specifications are often wrong or incomplete [40], rendering some of the verification efforts useless.
To this date, based on our literature and market product reviews, we are not aware of a system or
process that achieves this task as well as correlates these requirements to source code and test spec-
ifications ensuring the correctness of the full development life cycle. This increases the dependence
on the observed product behavior and common sense. In many cases, important corner cases and
system stress tests are missed. A behavioral anomaly detector can make sure that a safety critical
system does not fail as it experiences situations it was not designed to handle. An anomaly detector
can provide an early warning as it detects abnormal behavior, allowing the system to handle the
potential fault and fail safely.
No matter how much effort is being put into testing and verification, it will always be insufficient
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to catch all latent software errors before the system is deployed and used in the field. Researchers
have categorized bugs into two major categories: deterministic and non-deterministic. Determinis-
tic bugs can be easily detected and are a result of a particular combination of input to the program
[56], also known as Bohrbugs. Non-deterministic bugs seem chaotic and result from the presence of
a particular set of inputs along with other external factors [56], also known as Mandelbugs. These
external factors are dependent on the system’s operational environment and state and are highly
variable. Thus, an unknown combination of events in a given environment can result in triggering
a hidden Mandelbug. This makes Mandelbugs very difficult to occur during the verification phase.
Meanwhile, it is not possible to detect errors that do not result in system breakdowns [40]. This
showcases the need for a runtime mechanism that can learn how software should behave; making
it feasible to detect errors, or anomalies leading to errors, that have not been seen during the con-
trolled verification tests. Test coverage is inherently insufficient and cannot be relied on to cover
all possible system states that are produced when integrating different system modules and testing
them in all their operational environments. Even though best efforts have to be made, covering
every single possible operational environment does not seem feasible. This is further exacerbated
by the presence of the elusive Mandelbug.
4.1.1 The Difficulty of Feature Selection
Most anomaly detectors we have seen use specific software features or variables as basis of profiling
software (e.g. in [12] [71] [21][29][10][8][44]). This might not be the most accurate technique; while
these carefully chosen features might provide some form of behavioral anomaly detection, they
do not provide a holistic and complete view into how system components truly behave. These
select features are nothing but a small window into the outcome of some of the actions a process
takes. What if the choice of features was incomplete? How can one determine those features when
there is an unbounded number of system states that result from the complex interactions of the
different components in the system. Sometimes the features selected are incorrect, such as error
logs [50] that have no formal definition, or the presence of concrete requirements, and are left up to
the developer’s prerogative [19]. Sometimes the features are not resilient to the dynamic nature of
systems and the dynamic work loads they can be subjected to, such as process scheduling times [12],
CPU utilization [10] or other general system timings [44]. These might represent point anomalies in
a specific context, but are not necessarily anomalous in a different context. Using specific features
is analogous to a security guard keeping a list of features of employees that are allowed to enter a
restricted area, say eye and hair color, height and weight. This security guard can be easily fooled
by anyone mimicking the features on his list. Furthermore, an employee changing their hair color
or gaining weight would be considered an anomaly and disallowed into the building. The security
guard did not have enough foresight to consider the complex interactions that occur in people’s
lives that could result in weight gain, making this a difficult task to achieve. A more intelligent
security guard would be able to profile people based on their behavior, the way they talk, walk and
conduct themselves.
Feature selection is a difficult task and the effectiveness of an anomaly detector is heavily
dependent on this selection; an inferior set of features can result in an anomaly detector learning
an ineffective model of normality [35]. In addition to the inaccuracy of using a select subset of
features, determining this subset is in itself a non-trivial problem that fault prediction algorithms
face, given the vast amount of features that a complex system has [31]. Various research have gone
to length in order to accurately identify the most valuable features for fault prediction such as the
one presented by Irrera et al. [31] and the work presented by Kloft et al. [35] in which they propose
using machine learning techniques to aid in feature selection.
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4.2 Thread Homeostasis: The Design Principals
This section describes the general and high level design principals behind our system-wide thread
behavior anomaly detector using short sequences of messages and system calls. The details of the
implementation are described in chapter 5.
4.2.1 Sequences of System Calls as a Behavioral Profile
From an outside observer’s point of view, be it the kernel or a system process, we view the behavior
of a process as the way it interacts with other system components. A process can bootstrap itself,
open files, create shared memory objects and semaphores, use pipes, send messages and invoke the
kernel among other things. Thinking back to the security guard analogy, this is how the process
walks and talks. In order for a process to complete any of these functions, it has to interact with
the kernel via system calls. For the design of our anomaly detector, we build upon previous seminal
work in the field by Forrest et al., that a process’ normal behavior can be defined via the short
sequence of system calls it emits [23]. Our anomaly detector’s design follows pH’s, the behavior
anomaly detector designed and developed by Somayaji et al. [58] and described in detail in chapter
3. pH uses the system call types along with their relative order to build a behavioral model for
every process.
Using pH’s heuristic, the lookahead-pairs method (described in section 3), a generalization
of the process behavior is modeled in a compact profile. This model allows us to profile the
process’s natural and general behavioral without being too specific as to the exact sequence of
system calls it should be emitting. The system calls emitted by a processes are bound to vary
from one run to another, a model that is not representative of such variance in behavior will be
rendered useless with too many false-positives. We monitor the process in its natural operating
environment until we are convinced we have seen enough of all of its legitimate natural behavioral.
Any deviance from this model is regarded as un-natural and thus anomalous behavior. Thus, we
build an approximation of the process’ normal behavior while maintaining the sensitivity towards
novel sequence and anomalies as described in pH’s design guidelines [58].
One could argue that sequences of systems calls, as a selected profiling feature, could suffer from
the same feature selection issues we described in section 4.1.1. However we believe that building a
compact model of system calls that processes emit allows us to determine its behaviour at a very
granular and yet more generic level. Consider an error detector that decides to track the number of
open file descriptors that belong to a process; instead of keeping count, we monitor the sequence of
system calls a process has been invoking. An anomalous number of open file descriptors will surely
be reflected in the erroneous calls to fopen() found in the sequence, without having to specifically
identify what we’re looking for beforehand. This removes the burden of having to select variables
or extract important features to build a model of what the normal operating characteristics are
believed to be. The number of open file descriptors is not in itself the behavior of a process but
rather is the result of an action, the call to fopen().
4.2.2 System-wide Profiling Using Sequences of Messages
Given that our anomaly detector is specifically designed to run on a message-passing microkernel,
modeling sequences of system calls is not enough. Many critical system services, such as the
filesystem and process manager are implemented as user-level system services. These services can
only be communicated with via messages. In addition, many system calls are actually implemented
using the microkernel’s message passing utilities. For this reason, our anomaly detector builds a
compact profile of both system calls and messages that a process sends. This allows us to capture
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the full behavior of a process with regards to its interaction with microkernel as well as any other
process in the system it communicated with. Profiling all inter-process messaging allows us to
create a system-wide behavioral profile of all the system processes’ interactions and enables us to
detect anomalies in the process network.
4.2.3 Thread-based Profiling
Since the behavior of a process is the result of the aggregate behavior of its running threads, our
anomaly detector builds bahvioral profiles for every thread running on the system. We utilize
the concept of a process only to group its thread’s profiles together. Profiling individual thread
behaviors allows us to eliminate unwanted changes in behavior that occur due to factors outside
of the thread’s control, such as thread scheduling or thread pools. This is further expanded on in
Chapter 5. We explicitly define the normal behavior of a system in terms of the short sequences
of system calls and messages emitted by each thread in the system and hence the name Thread
Homeostasis (tH).
4.2.4 The System As a Network of Message-Passing Threads
Sufficiently complex systems are composed of highly-coupled components. An abnormal behavior in
a minor component that is not directly connected to the core operation of the system can potentially
bring the entire system down. While isolating specific components in a safety-critical system for
monitoring might have its merits, monitoring the entire system for faults and anomalies is essential
for effective anomaly detection. One does not know where and how a fault can be introduced in the
system. A perturbation of anomalies in one part of the system can be a strong early warning sign
that a fault is about to happen in a critical system component. This would allow the fault-tolerant
system to react in a timely manner. A hang or a system crash are far too late in the fault detection
stages. We view the system as a network of highly communicating, interconnected threads and
attempt to learn the entire network’s behavior as well as detect anomalies over the network as a
whole.
4.2.5 A Lightweight Anomaly Detector
An anomaly detector cannot change system properties in such a way that the core functional
requirements of a system are violated. Sensitive functional requirements such as stringent timing
deadlines that must be met might be violated given a detector that presents a heavy load and
overburdens the system. As such, tH must have a low memory and CPU utilization overhead
that fits the criteria of running on embedded systems in order to learn and detect anomalies in
an online, real-time manner. The detector should be as minimally intrusive as possible as not to
alter the underlying system’s behavior. We view system threads and processes as black boxes and
observe their behavior from an external entity using a reliable source of information, the kernel.
Modifications to the running software or the underlying operating system might alter the state of
the system and require further verification, testing, and perhaps even re-certification, which might
decrease the acceptance of adopting such technology. Having to modify the software to support
anomaly detection means that third-party, off-the-shelf components cannot be monitored as-is and
must be either modified or excluded from being monitored.
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4.2.6 tH as a User-level System Process
An error in the anomaly detector itself might compromise the safety of the entire system if not
properly isolated from other critical functions. Another advantage of using a microkernel-based
operating system for our implementation is that the anomaly detector will be running as a regular
user process, just like all the other system services. Its failure to operate correctly is completely
isolated from other safety-critical functions.
4.2.7 Building Behavioral Profiles During Verification
Safety-critical systems are subjected to an excruciating level of testing and verification. Many
safety-critical systems require certification before being allowed to operate in the field. Certification
bodies such as ISO 26262 for automotive functional safety usually have very high standards when
it comes to fault-tolerance testing and verification of the correctness of these systems [57] [53]. As a
result, they are subjected to an excruciating level of verification. We are of the opinion that safety-
critical software should experience a large percentage of the modes of operation it will be subjected
to when deployed. We make the assumption that if a misbehavior is not seen during testing it
should not be seen during deployment. That is not to say that the operational environment of
the system must exactly match the test environment, but it must be as close as humanly possible.
We utilize this to our advantage and use the verification phase to learn the expected behavior of
software before it becomes operational. More importantly, since we know that verification would
most likely be incomplete, we cannot claim that we are learning how the system should behave
from the verification phase, as this would be incomplete learning. Rather, we ought to claim that
we are learning how the system should not be behaving in the field.
If an anomaly is observed in the field, this might be an indicator that i) an actual anomaly
is present or ii) an incomplete test coverage was performed, or iii) a false-positive was detected.
However, an anomaly occurring during the verification phase can be an indicator that i) some
normal behavior was never experienced during the testing stage, indicating to a shortcoming in the
test coverage, or ii) unnecessary functions exist in the product that do not conform to the system’s
specification. These are serious enough indicators of a problem somewhere in the development life
cycle that warrants an investigation. Using an anomaly detector as part of the critical software
development life cycle might prove to be a useful tool.
4.2.8 Low False-Positive Rate
The false alarm rate is defined as the rate of misclassified normal behavior. An ideal anomaly
detection system would be one that has a 100% detection rate and a 0% false alarm rate. False
alarms depend on how well the model captures the normal behavior of a program while ignoring
the information that does not generalize well. The false alarm rate remains one of the top limiting
factors of how usable and effective an anomaly detector is [7]. Even for very low false positive rates,
the amount of data generated, thousands of kernel calls per second in our case, would translate into
a considerable number of false-positives [7]. This renders the system completely useless or even
dangerous to use, since users habituate and learn to ignore warning messages [5], which sometimes
are very serious true positives. Thus, an anomaly detector must strike the perfect balance between
maintaining a tolerable rate of false positives, while having a higher rate of true positive detection.
In contrast to general purpose desktop machines, embedded safety-critical systems naturally have
more concise and limited operations. They are mostly created to perform a few precise functions.
This makes them a fertile ground for more successful behavioral profiling and modeling efforts. We
hypothesize that safety-critical processes might show an acceptable level of behavioral determinism
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that makes it easier to profile their behavior. Deviations from a learnt behavioral model can be
marked as anomalous with a higher degree of confidence than their general purpose desktop machine
counterpart.
The next chapter details the technical design based on the guidelines presented in this chapter,
followed by a field evaluation. Much could be achieved by learning how to not behave.
5 Thread Homeostasis on a Message-Passing Microkernel
Based on pH’s core concept of modeling the behavior of processes using short sequences of system
calls, we propose a new online anomaly detector, Thread Homeostasis (tH). Our system is specifi-
cally tailored for use on a message-passing microkernel, namely, the QNX™ realtime safety-critical
operating system. tH differs from pH in two key areas: i) as opposed to profiling user-level pro-
cesses, it profiles and builds behavioral models for every thread in a user-level process in the system,
and ii) in addition to using system calls for profiling behavior, tH extends this profiling mechanism
to include unique identifiers of messages used in all inter-process communication, including the
messages sent to system-level services.
tH is an online and non-invasive anomaly detector. It relies on QNX’s highly granular tracing
facilities to capture data at runtime and update its models. This chapter describes the design,
technical details and the rationale behind the newly proposed system and its operating environment.
5.1 The Design approach
Before we get into the details of tH’s design, it is important to shed some light on how we came
to our design decisions. We adopted an iterative development methodology. Initially, we started
with an attempt to port pH directly onto QNX as is, without any change. However, due to the
message-based system call implementation, this proved to be impossible. A new technique had
to be created to account for the fact that not all system calls are implemented as traps into the
microkernel but rather some are delivered to the microkernel as messages. This led to the extension
of profiling to all message-based interprocess communication. We developed a mock client-server
application to verify the correctness and performance of our detector. Stress testing demonstrated
issues that led to further design changes to tH and to the QNX kernel. After our controlled testing
showed positive results, we started field evaluations with real deployed applications. This led to
a decision to build per-thread as opposed to per-process models. The following section describes
tH’s technical details and design.
5.2 The QNX™ Operating System
QNX is a POSIX-compliant, real-time, message-passing, preemptible microkernel. QNX is primar-
ily used in embedded safety-critical systems such as medical equipment and automotive systems.
QNX is a true microkernel; applications, device drivers and other system critical services run in
isolation in user-space. The microkernel implements a few core functions such as thread, timer,
synchronization, message-passing, signal, and scheduling services. Other common operating sys-
tem services such as process and memory management are not part of the microkernel and run in
regular user-space. This allows for a greater isolation between critical services such as drivers and
the kernel itself. In addition, it enables critical system components to be restarted upon failure
without the need to restart the entire system.
Message passing is QNX’s main interprocess communication mechanism and is a core funda-
mental function upon which QNX relies on. Message passing allows a process to send a message
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to another receiving process synchronously. In order for a message to be received, the message
receiving process, or server, creates what is known as a channel. Each channel has a unique iden-
tifier. A process wanting to send a message to another process must first connect to this unique
channel ID along with the receiving process ID, thereby creating a connection. Each connection has
a unique identifier and refers only to the receiving process, thread, and channel IDs. Messages are
the primary communication mechanism between regular user processes and system-level processes
such as the process manager.
Thus, as shown in figure 6, the QNX microkernel, along with a set of user-space privileged
and non-privileged services connected to the message-passing bus, form a fully functional operating
system. QNX only has 88 system calls 2 that are implemented as an exception or a trap into the
microkernel. The rest of the system calls are implemented as messages to the appropriate system
service such as the process or the memory manager. As an example, in a traditional monolithic
kernel such as Linux, a process wishing to create a new process calls the spawn() system call,
however, on QNX™, calling spawn() results in a message being sent to the process manager, using
the MsgSend*() API, with a PROC SPAWN message header type. The rest of the message payload
would include all the required spawn parameters and flags. Since messages are synchronous, the
process manager receives and performs the request while the sending process is blocked, waiting for
its reply. The MsgSend() API itself is a true system call implemented as a trap into the microkernel,
but its only function is to deliver a payload on a specific channel ID to a specific process. Most of
the system calls on the QNX operating system are implemented as messages and delivered via the
message-passing infrastructure. For the rest of this thesis, we refer to system calls implemented via
messages as kernel calls and calls implemented as a direct trap into the kernel as system calls.
QNX provides comprehensive instrumentation utilities. The instrumented version of the mi-
cokernel includes tracing facilities that provide a highly customizable and configurable trace data
stream. This enables real-time monitoring of a QNX system at runtime. QNX states that there
is a small 2% performance overhead when using the instrumented versus the non-instrumented
version of the microkernel. QNX provides APIs (the System Analysis Toolkit (SAT)) for programs
wishing to use the logging facilities. Since the data rate of the trace logging stream is quite high,
2As of QNX version 7.0
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logging applications usually enable tracing for a few seconds before saving the massive amount of
information to a file for later offline processing. As the system operates, the microkernel fills the
trace data buffer. When a preset buffer threshold is reached, the kernel calls a handler function
pre-configured via the trace logging application. The application would then consume trace data,
freeing up the kernel trace buffers to free up room for more trace data. The kernel buffers themselves
are pre-allocated and set up by the trace logging application and installed in the kernel via the
trace logging setup kernel calls. The trace data generated by the microkernel is highly configurable;
a trace logging application can use the tracing APIs to set filters and exclude or include specific
types of data. The different types of data are divided into classes and events. For example, one
can enable the THREAD class, which generates thread-related trace events such as which thread is
currently running on which CPU, or the KERNEL CALL class which generates trace events when
any kernel call is made by any process in the system. There are two generic tracing modes, a wide
mode and a fast mode. Wide mode generates more in-depth logging information, such as the full
argument list for kernel calls. Fast mode provides only a subset of the full information in a very
compact form. Wide mode generates more data, while fast mode generates data faster. A The size
of a MsgSendv() trace data is 8 bytes in fast mode and 24 bytes in wide mode.
To piece the different components together, Figure 7 shows an overview of the operations
involved when a process spawns a child. The numbered steps are described as follows:
• (1) Process 4 is started. It will be acting as a server to receive communication via messages.
It creates a channel via a system call and the microkernel assigns the channel ID 3 for Process
4.
• (2) Process 4 needs to spawn a child process. This is done via calling the kernel call spawn.
Spawn() is implemented in libc as a message to the process manager. When process 4 was first
initialized, a connection to the process manager communication channel was automatically
created.
• (3) Process 4 (libc) calls MsgSend() with the appropriate payload. The destination is Process
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1, the process manager and the payload include a message header (PROC SPAWN) and the
message body which contains the rest of the spawn parameters.
• (3a) Since MsgSend() itself is a system call, it traps into the microkernel (3b) which copies
the message from the source, Process 4, to the destination process manager (3c).
• (4) The process manager creates a new process with the help of a few system calls into
the microkernel and responds back to process 4 with the appropriate spawn() return value,
unblocking it.
• (5) The child process happens to be a client of its parent, Process 4. It is now free to connect
to process 4’s known channel 3 in order to send requests. The same set of steps are repeated
but this time, the destination process is not the process manager but rather Process 4.
• (6) Meanwhile, the microkernel tracing facilities are enabled and update a pre-setup shared
memory area with the encoded trace data of the various operations described.
• (7) The anomaly detector, which includes a trace logging component, is sent an interrupt
3 from the microkernel indicating that there is data available. The anomaly detector then
consumes the data from the shared memory and updates its models.
Qnet, QNX’s native networking protocol, enables message-passing across distributed QNX
nodes on a network. This allows an entire network of trusted nodes to appear as one operat-
ing system running on distributed network of CPUs. One can send a message to spawn a process
transparently on a remote node on a Qnet network. For this reason, any message being sent to a
channel must include the Qnet node identifier. This identifier is 0 if the message is intended for
the local node, otherwise the remote node ID is used.
QNX offers PPS, a persistent publish and subscribe utility. PPS enables writers to easily publish
information and readers to subscribe to notifications from certain publishers. The published infor-
mation is persistent across system reboots. tH uses PPS to publish different types of information
that can be easily subscribed to from a command line.
The QNX operating system has been chosen for our implementation for a few key technical
reasons. First, QNX’s microkernel architecture means that all services (such as drivers, filesystem,
etc.) are running outside the kernel as user-level processes. These processes mainly communicate via
messages. The system is heavily dependent on message-passing so much so that most of the highly
used system calls on UNIX-like systems are implemented via messages to system-level services that
provide core OS functionality such as process and memory management. This means that regardless
of the way applications are implemented, communication via message-passing is guaranteed to
occur. Second, since drivers and other critical system processes are not part of a big monolithic
kernel, they too can be monitored and profiled. This means that tH can profile and detect anomalies
in critical operating system services. Lastly, the QNX kernel is a safety certified microkernel 4; its
unique position in the embedded safety-critical market makes QNX a suitable target for this type
of anomaly-based fault detection work as we can test our solution with real safety-critical products
and collect meaningful data results from real-life applications.
3a pseudo-interrupt to be accurate as it is not a result of a true interrupt generated by the interrupt controller
4ISO 26262 and IEC 61508 certified
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5.3 Profiling Thread Behaviour
Thread Homeostasis profiles threads and not executables. An executable has one profile that
contains a single profile for every thread created by the process. This design decision was made
after going through the first round of experimentation with profile-based models. In the first round
of the detector’s implementation, we collected trace data and built models for every process in
the system. We ran experiments to determine the false-positive rates for the new detector and
calculated the average normalization times. The details of the experiment are described in detail
in the following chapter. The results were astonishingly satisfactory yet, not perfect. For some
deterministic processes in the system, we expected false positive rates to be as low as 0% and the
time taken to learn the process behavior to be low. However, this was not the case.
A simple controlled test application was built to try and further analyze the problem. The
test application included a server and client processes that communicate via messages. Both the
amount of communicated messages and the variability of the message types were configurable. A
series of test cases were built to verify the correctness of our implementation. All the stress tests
passed excepts for one, the multi-threaded client test. It took almost twice as much time to learn
the normal behavior of a client with 4 threads than it did with just one thread. Any variability
introduced in the messages sent by any of the threads would greatly affect the results. To add to
this, right after the client has normalized, anomalies start being detected without any change in
behavior.
Even though, every thread in the process has a separate sequence buffer, the per-process model
was being updated at non-deterministic times depending on which thread is currently executing.
Essentially, thread messages were being interleaved. This caused the model to think it has observed
a new sequence during training, when in fact, it did not. This resulted in a much higher normal-
ization or learning time. Performance measures were being recorded and we have seen this effect in
the amount of excessive profile thawing (frozen to unfrozen) as a result of the believed-to-be-new
sequence. Also, given a multicore system, threads are running concurrently on different CPUs; the
trace data is received and combined from all the different cores. There is no guarantee that they
will be correctly ordered except if we read their timestamps. This has two issues: i) if two threads
have the same timestamp, which one comes first? and ii) the message trace data comes in at a
very high rate, stopping to parse and compare the time stamps and waiting long enough to make
sure that no future event would be received with a timestamp earlier than the current one would
result in a great performance hit. We have implemented such timestamp parsing mechanism and
seen the performance penalty. The CPU usage rises from an average of 1.2% to a whopping 15%,
an unacceptable performance hit.
After further analysis, we determined that we had to build profiles for individual threads and
not for the entire process. Hence the name Thread Homeostasis.
5.4 A Thread Network Behavioral Model
Given pH’s promising experimental results and the nature of the target implementation environ-
ment, we decided to further extend pH’s modeling technique to include inter-process communication
in addition to system calls. Since a system can be viewed as a network of interconnected processes
and threads that communicate with the kernel as well as with one another, we hypothesised that
including communication ID used for inter-process communication in the short sequences of calls
would allow further insight into the behavior of a process and its threads. This is particularly
true in environments that heavily rely on IPC to perform their functions. This new model would
be a powerful indicator of the system’s natural behavior. The process is no longer viewed as an
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isolated entity, but rather a node in a larger network. Given a per-thread behavioral model, it will
be much harder for an anomalous user-space process to send messages to another process without
going unnoticed. This should result in an anomaly at many different levels in the system:
1. In the profile of the anomalous process, since it has never been seen sending such messages.
2. In the profile of the receiving process since it never received such messages.
3. Possibly in the profile of the receiving process as it sends a response to the anomalous process.
4. Possibly in the profile of the anomalous process as it receives the response.
5. Possibly in the profile of other processes: if as a result of the anomalous messages, the receiving
process has performed an action that requires sending a message to yet another process or
issued a system call.
Thus, anomaly detection would be performed on the system as a whole and not on an isolated
instance of a binary. A fault that causes a process to communicate with another in such a way that
has never been seen during verification should be easily detected through our model. We believe
that this holistic view of the system would allow errors to be observed at a much earlier stage before
becoming faults. We will no longer refer to a sequence of system calls but rather the sequences
of messages used for both process-to-process and process-to-kernel communication.
Typically, in multi-process scheduling-based operating systems, different processes communicate
with one another. However, there is no mandate or rule that restricts system architects from
building their entire safety-critical functionality using just one process along with a monolithic
kernel that includes all the required drivers. By implementing tH on QNX, we guarantee a system
in which a high level of inter-process connectivity and communication is built into its core design
philosophy.
5.4.1 System call identification
As discussed, system calls are either implemented via a trap into the kernel or via a message-send
to the system-level services. In order to build the model of message-sequences, the first question we
had to answer was: If we are building a two-dimensional table of look-ahead pairs of messages, how
can we uniquely identify a message from a thread to another so that we use this identifier as an
index in our table? Messages do not have a clear unique identifier that we can use. In a traditional
monolithic kernel, system calls are traps into the kernel and are assigned unique numbers to identify
them. Similarly, on QNX, trap-based system calls can be uniquely identified by their number.
However, this is not the case for the message-based calls. A message payload consists of a message
header or the command number followed by the command parameters. The same message header
can be sent by any process to another or by a process to the kernel. As an example, PROC SPAWN
is the message head that is sent to the process manager when calling spawn(); sending a message
header with the same value as PROC SPAWN (numerical value 0x0010) to the serial driver would
perform a completely different action. Message headers alone cannot uniquely identify a message.
Rather, information about the source and destination must be included: the source and destination
process and thread identifiers, pid and tid, the pid of the receiving process, the channel identifier
unto which the message is received, the node identifier (node id) on a Qnet network and finally,
the message identifier or the message head. These values combined uniquely identify a message.
We have modified the QNX microkernel to encode this data and send it to tH through the
trace logging facilities every time a message is sent. Figure 9 shows the minimal 96-bits received
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Figure 8: How a message is traced and stored in tH’s data structures.
by tH in addition to the kernel calls number. The source process index and thread ID are used
by tH to identify the appropriate thread profile to update. The remaining 64-bits are composed
of the 32-bit message head OR’d with the process index 5 of the receiving process, the channel ID
and the node ID to produce [PID TO (12-bits)| CHID (12-bits) | NID (8-bits) | MESSAGE
HEAD (32-bits)]. Messages sent to a kernel service always have a destination process ID of 1,
the process manager. This message identifying 64-bit value is then stored in an array. The array’s
index is then used to directly update the look-ahead pairs table. Thus, large 64-bit values are
converted into zero-based array index values. In case of a trap-based system call, the microkernel
only sends the 32-bit system call number along with the source process and thread IDs. Figure 8
shows an example data flow as a process sends a message to another until the unique message ID
is stored in the message ID list.
5.4.2 Interprocess Message Identification
Messages sent from a process to another are uniquely identified using the same technique that
the message-based kernel calls are identified. From the microkernel’s point of view, there is no
difference between sending a kernel-call message to the processes manager or sending a message to
another process.
5.5 Modifying the Instrumented Kernel
Due to some performance challenges (discussed in section 5.8), the QNX microkernel was modified
to tailor it to tH’s specific needs. We modified the instrumented kernel to replace the current
KERNEL CALL EXIT trace event 6 with our own. The new event contains the exact information that
tH needs without requiring all the extra event types. Recall that tH creates a single 64-bit value of
the tuple (process ID, channel ID, node ID) of the receiving process OR’d with the message head
5The process index is the unique bottom 12-bits of a process and are all what’s need to identify a process.
6A trace event sent every time a kernel call concludes and exits the kernel
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Figure 9: Kernel exit trace message bits.
(the first 32-bits of the message). Instead of emitting all this data from the kernel, we had the
kernel create this 64-bit mask of the values we needed and include it in the trace so that tH could
use it directly. The sending process ID was also replaced with the first 12 bits of the process ID;
enough data for tH to directly index into its process list to uniquely identify a process. Similarly,
for the thread and node IDs, only the bottom 12-bits were used. Thus, the process, thread, and
node indexes (indexes versus IDs now) were OR’d together to generate one 32-bit field. The 32-
bit field for the timestamp was not required (see section 5.8) and therefore was replaced with the
process, thread, and node indexes. The final emitted information is shown in Figure 9. This single
KERNEL CALL EXIT trace event now contains the required information that tH needs in as little
space as possible.
5.6 Runtime Structure and Organization
tH is divided into three main core components. The first is a core anomaly detection component
that runs agnostic of the operating system, it maintains a generic view of the process and thread
information, builds the models and detects anomalies. This core component is also responsible for
saving and loading saving profiles to and from disk. The second component performs the QNX
dependent functions, such as setting up trace logging with the kernel, parsing trace information and
presenting it to the anomaly detector through a predefined API. The third component is the user
interface component. For this, we used persistent-publish and subscribe (PPS) to present various
pieces of information to the user.
Figure 10 shows an enumerated outline of the main data structures used at runtime. The
components and the data flowing into them are described as follows:
1. tH starts and sets up tracing with the microkernel. Using the trace logging API, tH installs
a shared memory area that the kernel will be using as a buffer to store the trace data. tH
also sets up the handler or pseudo-interrupt handler. This is used by the kernel to inform tH
of the availability of the trace data.
2. tH reads the json configuration file and extracts runtime parameters. These include the size of
the local memory area to copy the trace data into, the size of the sequence window, the time
tH has to wait before a frozen profile is marked as normal and the location of the profile’s
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Figure 10: tH’s components and data flow.
folder on disk. If training or testing profiles exist on disk, tH reads and loads them into
memory.
3. Based on the pre-setup tracing filters (‘kernel call exit’ events) the microkernel writes the
trace data into the pre-installed memory region.
4. The kernel interrupts tH via the pseudo interrupt handler, notifying it that new data exists.
5. tH copies the trace data into its local buffer, freeing up the shared memory area for further
kernel traces.
6. Using the source pid index in the trace data, the master process information table is accessed
to retrieve the process structure. The trace data tells us that a specific thread, belonging to
specific process has issued a kernel call. If this kernel call is a MSG SEND kernel call, it means
that the process has sent a message and the trace data will contain the unique message
identifier described above.
7. The thread specific structure is retrieved along with the thread specific sequence window.
8. The unique message identifier is stored in the message identifier list and its index is retrieved.
If it already exists, its index is returned. The thread-specific sequence window is updated
with the index.
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9. Depending on whether the thread is in the testing or training phase, the correct look-ahead
pairs table is updated. Given that the unique 64-bit message ID is now translated to a
zero-based index, this is a fast O(1) access.
10. The PPS interface is updated accordingly. If the thread is still in training, the interface is
updated to reflect statistical data, such as normal count, last mod count and profile status
(frozen, thawed). If the thread has normalized and is in testing phase, the interface is updated
to show if the trace contained any anomalies.
Given the per-thread model, the different profile states, frozen, thawed and normal, happen at
the thread level.
5.7 Other Differences from pH
This section presents some other minor differences from the original pH implementation. These
design decisions were made to better suit the embedded safety-critical nature of tH’s use case.
5.7.1 Dual Runtime Modes
To reduce false positives, pH has a unique algorithm to allow the addition of training data during
testing (see Section 3.0.7). If during testing, a certain sequence is seen frequently enough, the
testing profile is unlocked, the new sequence added and training restarts for that process. We
believe this is ideal for a general-purpose system, however, not for our use case. If tH is to be
used on critical infrastructure, then it is safe to assume that the expectation would be to have
the testing profiles generated during production then simply installed and used during deployment.
From our experience in the field, critical systems that do not have deterministic behavior are not
popular and allowing for tH to train in an operational system would greatly hamper its adoption.
In addition, we make the assumption that safety-critical systems are deterministic in nature and
that exhaustive verification and system tests will be performed for safety and certification purposes.
This verification phase is when tH will be profiling and learning the system behavior. We do not
expect any deviance in the learnt behavior. Any occurrence of anomalous behavior during testing
time is only considered a failure of complete test coverage or actual anomalous behavior but not a
false-positive.
Having said that, we allow the addition of anomalies to the profiles if the entire system is
considered to be in the learning phase. Even if the thread profile has normalized, if the system is in
learning mode, we add the “anomaly” as a valid sequence to the profile. After having run the first
round of experiments, we noticed that one of the processes, the sensor process, generated anomalies
on the same training dataset. The sensor has multiple threads, and two of them raised anomaly
alarms. The first found 36 anomalies in 1423946 calls and the other 14 anomalies in 4110899 calls.
After further investigation, it became clear that another process, Parallax, was the main user of the
sensor. Parallax had not yet normalized and thus, was exhibiting new behavior and interacting with
the sensor in new ways. Meanwhile, the sensor had normalized and locked its profile thinking that
these new interactions were anomalous. One might think that increasing the time-to-normal time
might solve this problem, but it doesn’t. The sensor needs to know that Parallax has normalized
before it locks its profiles regardless of the time-to-normal time. There was an easy and straight
forward solution to this problem: If we are in learning mode, any anomaly encountered would be
regarded as normal and added as a legitimate sequence to the testing profile even if the thread
profiles have normalized and locked themselves. Running tH in detection mode disables this feature
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and never adds new sequences. the entire tH process now has two runtime modes, learning mode
and detection mode. Both Parallax and Sensor are described in detail in the next chapter.
5.7.2 Monitoring Critical Processes only
Even though this goes against our design philosophy, we profile and monitor the behavior of the
system’s thread network. tH can be configured to monitor specific processes only. This was useful
to us when we ran the mock client/server application; we did not need to be bothered by any other
system events and excluded all other processes in the system. This is also useful if a specific subset
of processes that are deemed critical need to be monitored excluding other not-so-important ones.
5.7.3 Configurable window size
pH’s original implementation used a sliding window size of 9. Luckily, this allowed the use of a
single byte in the master sequencing table to represent an intersection of two message identifier
entries in the table (current and previous). Each bit in the window indicated whether the previous
system call has been seen before the current system call, during training. This is optimal in terms
of storage space, since a byte is the least amount of space that could be used. In terms of run-time
performance, the worst case scenario is shifting at most eight bits to flip the last bit.
tH allows the efficient use of a variable configurable size window. During initialization, a global
small table is built that allows an O(1) lookup of the physical bit location within the n-sized
window, given the current and previous message IDs. The physical bit location can then be used
to flip the required bit in the master sequencing table. This configurable window size would allow
us to easily experiment with different window sizes in the future. For now, the window size is 8.
5.7.4 System Call Delays
As discussed earlier, pH reacts to anomalies by delaying the corresponding anomalous system calls.
The concept behind a delay is to give a system administrator enough time to determine the validity
of such a sequence, approving or rejecting the application behavior. Reacting to anomalies on a
safety-critical system is a huge undertaking that can have serious consequences. We believe that
reaction to anomalies must be done on a case-by-case basis by those who have intimate knowledge of
the system. A generic reaction that fits all use cases in such sensitive environments is not suitable.
As such, tH does not react to anomalies but rather has a functional interface to notify those who
subscribe to alarms from anomalous traces. The reaction is left up to them.
5.8 Implementation Challenges
5.8.1 Customizing Trace Logging for tH
Initially, we used the original stock instrumented kernel. We instructed the microkernel through
the trace logging API to send us trace data every time a kernel call was entered in the kernel. This
allowed us to trace both trap-based system calls and any message sent via the MsgSend() kernel
call. Trace logging was enabled in wide mode, since we needed the extra information associated
with the events. Unfortunately, the ‘kernel call entered’ trace event was not enough; it lacked other
information we needed. We were forced to ask the kernel for more types of trace events in order
for us to have the required information. This drastically increased the size of the trace data and
negatively affected tH’s performance. Some of the missing data included:
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1. The channel ID of the receiving process. This is required for the unique message ID creation.
The ‘kernel call entered’ trace event only included the connection ID used by the sending
process. This meant that we had to ask the kernel to send us trace events every time a
process connects to a channel. This way we could maintain internal lists of connection ID
to channels for cross reference. Now that we are tracing channel connection events, we had
to trace connection detach events as well so that we could remove the channel ID from our
internal lists.
2. The issuing thread ID. The ‘kernel call entered’ trace event only included the ID of the CPU
the kernel call was running on. In order to obtain this information, the ‘thread running’
event was enabled. This event is issued every time a thread becomes runnable on a CPU. An
internal list of CPU IDs and current threads running on them was created for cross reference.
Table 14 shows a detailed description of all the trace events collected from the kernel. The trace
data generated by the instrumented kernel is extensive and highly granular; its primary purpose
is to debug a system over a brief period of time. Even if one could provide enough storage space
to store all the generated trace data, parsing this information was meant to be performed offline
and not in a live, online, and continuous fashion. tH has a hard requirement to run full-time and
monitor all the processes in the system with a minimum overhead. Given all the extra information
we were requesting from the kernel, tH’s performance degraded and became CPU intensive 7. At
times, CPU usage rose to 20% on particular quad core machines running a fairly quiet system. We
started seeing warning messages indicating that trace events were being dropped because tH could
not keep up with parsing this sheer amount of trace data while updating multiple cross-reference
lists and behavior models. Something had to be done; after all, what good is an anomaly detector
running on an embedded safety-critical system that consumes all the CPU resources?
This led to the initial decision to modify the QNX kernel in order to tailor the KERNEL CALL ENTER
8 trace event to tH’s specific needs. Each event now included:
• A time stamp of when the kernel call exit occurred. This is a 32-bit field and is required for
the receiver of the trace data to sort out of order trace events as we will see later.
• The process ID of the process that issued the kernel call. This is a 32-bit field.
• The thread ID of the thread that issued the kernel call. This is a 32-bit field.
• The kernel call number, part of a 32-bit header.
• If this is a message send kernel call then the following is also included:
– The process ID (32-bits) of the message receiving thread.
– The channel ID (32-bits) of the message receiving thread.
– The node ID (32-bits) of the message receiving thread.
– The first 32-bits of the message header being sent.
This brings the total trace data size to 228 bits in addition to a constant header size of 32
bits. The instrumented QNX kernel generates two types of trace data events; simple and combine
event [2]. A simple event is a trace data event that is at most 96 bits in size. These events are
7The instrumented kernel’s overhead did not increase but rather tH’s parsing of data in realtime
8An tracelogging event logged every time a system call is called
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used when an entire event’s data can fit in 96 bits or less. A combine event however is an event
type that has a variable length. Combine events are used to represent events that need to supply
more than 96 bits of data. The kernel creates multiple combine events and adds them to a queue
ready to be consumed. However, due to performance constraints, the kernel does not wait for all
the combine events belonging to one trace event to be added to its internal trace queue holding
up other kernel calls. The kernel services other kernel calls and adds their trace data to the queue
before going back to enqueue the original combine events. Thus, the combine events of different
traces are interleaved 9.
As a result, tH would then have to recognize that the trace data is a combined event (part of
the trace data header) and use the time stamp to re-order events in order to get the correct view of
the trace data. This re-ordering of combine events is time consuming and extremely CPU intensive.
Looking at the required data, we realized that we could indeed compress our data into 96 bits (from
an original 128 bits) and turn the multiple combine events emitted on every KERNEL CALL ENTER
to a single simple event. This eliminated the need to have a 32-bit timestamp field as we are
guaranteeing that the newly added kernel trace event will never generate a combine event. As a
result, we were able to reuse the time stamp field and optimize the trace logging message sent to
tH as described in section 5.5 to a single simple event, 96-bits in size. 40% of the code in tH was
eliminated due to this kernel change. tH’s CPU usage dropped from 20% to an average of 1.2%
CPU on a heavily utilized system.
5.8.2 Kernel Call Restarts
Having incorporated the above performance enhancement, we were ready to run a real-life test on
one of the services used in production, the Sensor service described in the next chapter. The test
ran for over three days without successfully normalizing and freezing the profile. We went back
to our test harness and analysed the trace data generated for our proximity client that sends two
different types of messages in a tight loop, message header number 1024 followed by 1025. The
expectation was to see this sequence in the trace data:
MSG SEND:1024 ,MSG SEND:1025 ,MSG SEND:1024 ,MSG SEND: 1 0 2 5 . . .
Except the following sequence is what was actually observed:
MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND:1025 ,
MSG SEND:1025 , MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND:1025 , MSG SEND:1025 . . .
When tH receives the MSG SEND trace from the kernel, it indicates that the process in question
has entered the kernel via the MsgSend kernel call and that the kernel is about to start processing
its request but the process has not yet exited the kernel. The QNX kernel was further instrumented
using the existing kernel tracing APIs to determine when a kernel call is done and exits the kernel
back to the user process. Here is the result:
MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND EXIT: 1024 ,
MSG SEND:1025 , MSG SEND:1025 , MSG SEND EXIT: 1025 ,
MSG SEND:1024 , MSG SEND EXIT:1024 , MSG SEND:1025 ,
MSG SEND:1025 , MSG SEND EXIT:1025 . . .
Using the mock client that sends two types of messages, the sequence shows that indeed, the
QNX kernel was behaving correctly and as expected. We were seeing the same kernel calls in
9See interleaved events in the System Analysis Toolkit Guide [2]
32
succession 4.3% of the time (69043 out of 1572634 calls). However we have a major philosophical
bug in our implementation of the anomaly detector: kernel-call restarts.
Any thread wishing to have the microkernel perform an operation on its behalf issues a system
call. Only one CPU is allowed to be in the kernel at a time. Usually, system calls are very short
in duration to reduce the oveall latency of the system. However, a situation may arise that a low
priority thread is in the kernel while a higher priority thread is waiting to get into the kernel. To
reduce the latency for the more important system operations, the microkernel is fully preemptible.
This means that the higher priority thread will kick the lower priority one out of the kernel and
take its place. All the operations that the lower priority thread has completed in the kernel will be
unwound. The next time this lower priority task runs, the preempted system call will be restarted
from the beginning. Having said that, there might be a point in the system call’s lifetime where
the kernel would need to manipulate certain shared data structures. If this is the case, the kernel
locks itself. This blocks preemption by a higher priority thread and allows the kernel to safely
modify common variables without the risk of yielding and leaving them in an inconsistent state. If
needed, the kernel could potentially disable interrupts to block an interrupt service routine (ISR)
from interrupting it. The kernel is usually locked for a very small amount of time to minimize
interrupt and higher priority thread latency.
Unfortunately, given the kernel call restarts, we had no hope in having deterministic behaviour
that we could extract a normal pattern from. The kernel call restarts were happening 4.3% of the
time; their occurrence was unpredictable depending on timing, interrupts and scheduling priorities
of other threads in the system. A change had to be made.
Instead of asking the kernel to send us trace data whenever a kernel call starts, we flipped
things around. We asked the kernel to send us trace data when the kernel call is exiting. This
guarantees the elimination of the kernel call restart problem and provides determinism. This meant
that whenever we receive a KERNEL CALL ENTER trace event, we would then have to wait for the
KERNEL CALL EXIT in the trace data since we need the information from both the KERNEL CALL ENTER
and the KERNEL CALL EXIT events. Unfortunately, asking the kernel to send us KERNEL CALL EXIT
trace events in addition to all the KERNEL CALL ENTER trace events only doubled the size of the
trace data 10, requiring more CPU usage. In addition, more complex tH code had to be added to
synchronize between the kernel call starts and the kernel call exit trace events so that the former
could be eliminated appropriately. This change was more error prone.
Eventually, the decision was made to add a new KERNEL CALL EXIT trace event that included
all information that our modified KERNEL CALL ENTER event included. Since there is no need for
the KERNEL CALL ENTER events, they were disabled. Now tH is receiving a compact stream of
KERNEL CALL EXIT events containing all the information it needs as shown in Figure 9 and de-
scribed in section 5.5. This eliminated the need for most of the other trace data previously re-
quired and more than one third of the code in tH required to build its internal data structures.
NTO TRACE KERCALLENTER was replaced with a NTO TRACE KERCALLEXIT, KER CONNECT ATTACH,
KER CONNECT DETACH and NTO TRACE THRUNNING were no longer required. tH is now much leaner
(40% of the code was eliminated), less computationally intensive (an average of 1.2% versus 20%),
and more powerful as our results will show.
5.9 The 32-bit versus 16-bit Message Header Dilemma
Figure 9 shows the three 32-bit values sent in the trace data when the MsgSend kernel call is
invoked by a process. The last value is the first 32-bits of the message payload. Our intention
10One KERNEL CALL EXIT event for every successful non-preempted KERNEL CALL ENTER event.
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is to differentiate between them for profiling. All messages to the QNX kernel (procnto) use a
16-bit message type in their header, and the rest of the message contains the data, including the
second 16-bits of the message head. Our decision to include the additional 16-bits of message data
was made based on the assumption that usually, specialized safety-critical software does not have
too much variance in their messages. Too much variance means that we will not be able to easily
profile the system. Using our test harness, we ran some field evaluations using the 32-bit value
and determined that the average number of different 32-bit message types is around ten. Table ??
shows the number of different 32-bit message headers for some of the system processes we profiled.
Some of these processes are quite complex such as Parallax, a process responsible for decision
making in autonomous vehicles, devb-umass [61], QNX’s mass storage device driver, drm-intel,
QNX’s direct rendering manager for Intel Graphics [60], Screen [68], QNX’s graphics compositing
windowing subsystem, and fs-nfs3 [62], QNX’s network file system driver. There doesn’t seem to
be a high variability in the different types of messages, therefore, using the entire 32-bits might
be suitable. However, one test made us re-evaluate this decision: the QNX port of Google’s Blink
browser engine (BlinQ) [18].
Process Name # Distinct Kernel calls Total kernel calls
launcher 10 7630
qterminal 20 12615
devb-umass 16 13520
io-hid 1 1707578
slog2info 6 88418
parallax 9 117872451
drm-intel 8 35086592
screen 11 7313114
analogclock 5 442815
fs-nfs3 17 9372245
slogger2 3 433
Table 1: Total number of distinct kernel calls of 32bit message headers
Even though our work here targets specialized safety-critical software with a very small and
limited functionality, pushing the limits during this design phase helps us gain further insight into
the data we are attempting to model.
Table 15 shows the trace data collected from the web browser for approximately 10 hours. The
browser was left running an active HTML5 openGL test. The first column shows the destination
process, followed by the 16-bit message header and the 32-bit header. The last row shows their
total count. In total, Blinq sent 61688997 messages to 11 different processes in the system. There
were 52 distinct 16-bit message types and 85 distinct 32-bit message types. The maximum ratio
between them is 1:9 (1 16-bit header has 9 different 16-bit pays loads). As an example, in the
process with index 1, the process manager is sent one message of a single 16-bit header, 0x0100,
however if we include the entire 32-bit header with the extra 16 bits of the data payload we’d find
five extra distinct types: 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0003, 0x0005, and 0x0007.
Although the results in Table 1 are not conclusive, we still opted for reducing the message
header to 16-bits for the first round of experiments to avoid non-deterministic behavior resulting
from the greatly varying payloads. The entire 32-bit payload and perhaps even more will be part
of our experiments in the future.
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5.9.1 A Summary of the Technical Contributions
The following list summarizes the technical contributions of this work:
1. Thread Homeostasis, tH, is an anomaly detector based on pH’s system call profiling concept
was created for the QNX operating system.
2. tH profiles running system threads.
3. In addition to system calls, tH builds models from sequences of message identifiers used in
interprocess communication.
4. A novel approach to uniquely identify an IPC message was created.
5. The QNX microkernel was modified to customize the trace data generated. This allowed tH
to run full-time with low CPU usage overhead while both collecting and parsing a continuous
stream of compact trace data in real-time with low latency.
5.10 Usage
5.10.1 Starting up the anomaly detector
Ideally, tH should be started on system boot right after the kernel and before any other programs
have started. This enables tH to capture all system calls made by any process right from its
inception. However, tH can be started at any point in time, either before or after the process(es)
being monitored have started.
5.10.2 Configuration file
A configuration file is required as a command-line argument for tH. JSON was chosen to represent
the configuration file since it is trivial to extend and add support for future configuration options.
The list below shows a sample configuration file. The configuration file structure and description
are as follows:
• buf size: Allows configuring the kernel tracing buffer size. Not Implemented.
• win size: The size of the sliding window. The current default is 8 and the maximum is 32.
This option has been added so that we could run future experiments with different window
sizes.
• mon list: A comma-separated list of processes to monitor. If this list is empty, all processes
are monitored by default, otherwise, the monitoring is only limited to this list. A few sub-
options identify a process:
– The sub-field id is the process identifier
– type specifies whether id contains a process name or a process ID (currently only process
name is supported).
• exc list: This is a comma-separated list of processes to exclude from monitoring. Not Im-
plemented.
• prof path: The full path to profile data. Existing profiles will be read from there and new
profiles will be created at this path.
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• notify: Will be used to specify a specific process to notify when anomalies occur. Not
Implemented.
• normal wait: This is the time (in seconds) that tH will keep the profiles frozen before it
deems it normal.
{
” bu f s i z e ” : 64 ,
” w in s i z e ” : 8 ,
”mon l i s t ” : [
{
” id ” : ” proc /boot/ io−bluetooth ” ,
” type” : 2 ,
” desc ” : ” b luetooth d r i v e r ” ,
” w in s i z e ” : 8 ,
” no t i f y ” : 1
} ,
{
” id ” : ” proc /boot/btman” ,
” type” : 2 ,
” desc ” : ” b luetooth manager” ,
” w in s i z e ” : 8 ,
” no t i f y ” : 1
}
] ,
” e x c l i s t ” : [
] ,
” pro f path ” : ”/home/myqnx7/ tH roo td i r ” ,
” no t i f y ” : 1 ,
” normal wait ” : 180
}
Listing 1: Configuration file example.
5.10.3 Status Information
As mentioned earlier, QNX persistent publish and subscribe (PPS) is used as the main interface for
tH. Figure 11 shows the PPS interface director listing. There are two different types of information
that tH presents, a general overview of the system using the status object and specific thread
information using the per-process object. The status object contains a summary and general
status information and thread specific information that is represented by objects with matching
process IDs, concatenated with the thread ID names. The listing below shows a part of the output
from the status object as read from command line:
Figure 11: PPS interface directory list.
@status
anom count:n:0
pid 241689::DETECTING:NORMAL:0
pid 241689 tid 1::DETECTING:NORMAL:0
pid 241689 tid 2::DETECTING:NORMAL:0
pid 241689 tid 7::DETECTING:NORMAL:0
pid 274460::LEARNING:THAWED
pid 274460 tid 4::DETECTING:NORMAL:0
pid 274460 tid 5::DETECTING:NORMAL:0
pid 274460 tid 6::LEARNING:THAWED
pid 274460 tid 7::DETECTING:NORMAL:0
pid 274460 tid 8::LEARNING:FROZEN
s t a t e : : r u nn i n g
Listing 2: PPS process information example.
The entries under the status object are as follows:
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• anom count: The total number of anomalies found across all threads and process so far.
• pid number : The status of process with ID number. A process can be in several modes:
normal, learning and frozen or learning and thawed. If the process is normal, this means
that all its threads have normalized. If all the threads have frozen, the process’s state is
LEARNING:FROZEN. Otherwise, the process remains in the LEARNING:THAWED status.
• pid number tid : Similar to the process ID information above but specific to thread ID.
• state: tH’s running status, running or none if tH is disabled.
anoma l i e s :n : 0
f r o z e n : n : 1
l a s t mod count :n :1230
normal count :n :1300
pa th : : . / t e s t c l i e n t
s equence s :n : 24
state::NORMAL
t ime to norma l :n :1000
t r a i n c oun t : n : 1 300
t e s t c oun t : n : 1 0 00
t i d : 1
Listing 3: PPS process information example.
Under each process ID the following entries and their description are found:
• anomalies: The number of anomalies seen during testing.
• frozen: 1 if the thread is currently frozen, 0 otherwise.
• last mod count: The number of system calls that have occurred since last modification.
• normal count: The number of normal calls seen while in training phase before the profile
is locked.
• path: The location of the process binary on the filesystem.
• sequences: The number of sequences that have inserted (not the number of look-ahead
pairs).
• state: The state of the thread. Could be one of: normal, frozen or thawed.
• time to normal: The amount of time taken for this thread to fully train, normalize and
lock the profile.
• train count: Total number of system calls seen during training.
6 Field Evaluation
After having verified the expected behaviour of tH using the test harness, we now evaluate it on
real in-field software. The evaluation is split into two parts: the learning phase and the detection
phase. Testing whether tH will be able to determine a behavioral pattern, freeze a profile and then
normalize, is an important deciding factor on whether tH is practical for in-field use. If processes do
not have deterministic behaviour, tH will not be able to normalize or will require a very long time
until it thinks it has observed all possible combinations of messages and kernel calls. The argument
here is that embedded software has enough deterministic behaviour that can be profiled by our
detector. More importantly, a lack of deterministic behavior would mean that tH would detect
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Figure 12: The various sensors and processes used to record and replay sensor data.
anomalies in perfectly normal data. The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the false-positive
rate generated by tH while running perfectly normal software.
Even though we run a few experiments to evaluate tH’s ability to detect true positives, these
experiments are in no way extensive or in-depth. The creation of an unbiased faulty dataset
for evaluating an anomaly detector correctly is no trivial task. Due to timing constraints, we
purposefully left this type of evaluation to a future work where a proper fault-injection framework
will be used to inject faults into the running software for an attempt to introduce behavioral
anomalies observable by tH.
6.1 The Evaluation Data
Ideally, tH would be evaluated on a system with some level of safety-critical functionality, after all,
most of the systems that use QNX are safety-critical systems. Originally, we intended to test tH
on one of QNX’s autonomous vehicles [1]: create a software load with our kernel change, build a
system identical to the one on the vehicles including tH, upload it to the vehicle then train and
test tH while driving around the city. However, we were bound by ethical and legal constraints
due to the high risk level associated with such an experiment. Thankfully, we found the next best
alternative, simulating driving around the city using real-life, high resolution sensor data.
While driving the QNX demo autonomous vehicle [1] around various cities, the Blackberry
QNX team recorded some of the data received from various sensors used by the vehicle. The
sensors generating the high-resolution data included a GPS, an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU),
an Infrared (IR) sensor, a LiDAR, a Radar, and left and right cameras. The data was recorded for
later offline analysis and simulations. Each recording session usually lasts for a few seconds, since
the sensors generate a very high volume of data. This data can be replayed offline to the exact
same software stack that is responsible for part of the autonomous driving, street object detection.
From the software’s perspective, the car believes it is driving over that same section of the map
with the exact same sensor inputs even though it is sitting idle in the lab.
QNX’s Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) [66] represent a core software component
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for autonomous (and non-autonomous) vehicles running QNX. The Sensor service software is part
of this package [67]. Sensor is used to capture data from various inputs, including multiple cameras
around the vehicle, radar, LiDAR, IMU and GPS sensors and present it to other system components.
In order to provide the ability to simulate real-world data of a self-driving car, the Sensor software
was designed to sensor inputs from high-definition recordings instead of reading the live feed from
a hardware sensor.
Parallax Screen
Sensor Service
Safety-Certified QNX OS
Camera 1
Camera 2
Camera 3
Camera 4
Radar
LiDAR
GPS
BeeBox Board support package
Intel GPU
Other BeeBox hardware (memory, 
audio chip, mmc, etc.)
Intel DRM
Figure 13: Parallax/Sensor System overview.
Sitting on top of Sensor is another layer of software that would be making decisions based on
the captured data streams from the multitude of sensors around the car. Fortunately, QNX has
its own demo implementation of such decision making software, Parallax. Parallax is an internally
developed, 11, highly complex piece of software used for analyzing images and various sensor data
in order to detect objects, patterns, and pedestrians. QNX ADAS customers would usually have
their own algorithms that enable autonomous vehicles to make the right decision. Figures 13 and
12 show an overview of how all the components connect together. The Sensor services collects data
from all the input sources. Parallax asks Sensor for the data, makes its calculations, then outputs
the data to the screen using the Screen process [68]. Since we run our tests on an Intel-based
system, the screen uses Intel Direct Rendering Manager (DRM) server to utilize the GPU [60].
The sensor data is stored on a USB key and hence the use of the USB disk driver devb-umass [61].
All of this runs on the safety-certified QNX operating system and the board support package layer
(system bootup layer). Figure 14 shows screen shots of various Parallax.
The software stack is quite sophisticated and CPU intensive. At the time of this experiment,
Parallax contained 42,443 lines of code in addition to 10 shared libraries it links to. Parallax
consumes an average of 64% of the CPU. The Sensor service has 2,107 lines of code and on average
uses 13% of the CPU. Screen consumes 2% of the CPU and has 57,683 lines of code in addition to
the libraries it links to. Intel-drm has 10,464 lines of code and consumes 11% of the CPU.
The recorded data is divided into multiple datasets. Each dataset consists of 7 files, one for
each sensor recording. A manifest file is added to each dataset containing the physical location on
11Currently for internal use and demo purposes.
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the USB key of each of the files was well as the type of sensor the data represents (radar, Lidar,
GPS, IR, IMU or light/right Camera). This manifest file is passed to the Sensor process as part
of its initialization, enabling it to read the corresponding dataset files. The length of each dataset
ranges from 5 to 15 seconds of recordings, with an average size of 3 gigabytes per dataset. Because
the length of the recordings is very short due to the high volume of data generated, the recordings
for each dataset is replayed in a continuous loop. The car “thinks” it is driving over the same area
over and over again. In total, we had 16 datasets.
Figure 14: Parallax screenshots.
Process Name Process Description
devb-umass The driver for a USB mass-storage interface [61]. All of the rerecorded
sensor data were stored on a drive and hence the inclusion of this driver.
io-hid Manager for human interface devices such as a touch screen or a mouse
[63]
slog2info A QNX client to display messages from the system log [64].
io-pkt The network driver [65]
Table 2: Other QNX system binaries involved in the evaluation and their description
6.1.1 The Run
The field tests were run on an Intel x86 64 Beebox [6]. The Beebox used has a quad-core 2.08GHz
Intel Celeron 64-bit processor with 2 MB L2 of Cache, 2GB of ram and a 32GB eMMC. The system
has an Intel HD Graphics for Intel Celeron Processor. In addition to the services mentioned above,
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Process Name 180s 600s 1200s 3600s 10800s
Parallax 5.97E-06% 81E-06% 2.18E-06% 5.32E-06% 4.38E-06%
Sensor 7.87E-05% 3.54E-05% 1.49E-04% 8.32E-05% 3.25E-05%
Intel-drm 2.47E-06% 2.75E-06% 2.99E-06% 4.93E-06% 1.93E-06%
Screen 1.68E-05% 7.66E-06% 1.98E-05% 1.94E-05% 2.15E-05%
devb-umass 1.55E-03% 6.71E-03% 7.23E-03% 7.91E-03% 7.54E-03%
io-pkt-v6-hc 3.48E-01% 2.11E+00% 1.83E+00% 0.00E+00% 0.00E+00%
Table 3: Average false positives for different time-to-normal profiles for profile-based models
Table 2 shows all the other binaries that are not a core part of the test but where utilized during
the test runs.
After the system has booted up, a USB key containing all the sensor data that Parallax and
Sensor will be streaming was mounted. The Screen and Intel-drm services were then started,
followed by Sensor. To start streaming data and simulate driving, Parallax was started. Finally,
tH was started over a remote SSH session.
6.2 The Learning Phase
During the learning phase, we attempt to teach tH the behavior of the software stack. Initially,
we selected three datasets for training. The datasets were over 7.5 gigabytes in size for a total 28
seconds of driving.
For the first dataset, the simulation was run in a continuous loop until the critical processes
under test had normalized. tH was run with a time-to-normal value of 3,600 seconds, that is, profiles
would remain frozen for 1 hour before they normalize if they haven’t seen new sequences within that
time period. The choice of this particular time-to-normal value was not arbitrary. In the previous
version of tH, where we profiled processes as opposed to threads, we ran our experiments with
different time-to-normal values (180s, 600s, 1200s, 3600s,10800s) over seven datasets for each value.
Table 3 along with the graphs in Appendix E show the false positives generated during testing. We
concluded that the time-to-normal values did not have any significant effect on the false-positive
rate for our testing datasets. Even though the tests ran for a long time, they were, in reality, a
few seconds of real intensive sensor data replays run in a continuous loop. After normalization was
complete for the first dataset, the training profiles were saved to disk.
In order to augment datasets 2 and 4 after the profiles have been normalized and locked,
we ran tH in learning mode. As described in Section 5.7.1, this allows tH to add more data to
the already locked profiles. After no new behavior has been detected for over an hour, tH was
manually terminated and allowed to save its augmented profiles to disk. A tool was developed to
parse through the binary profiles and produce human-readable results.
It is worth noting that many of the processes in the system did not normalize or were not profiled
at all. This was due to the fact that they were inactive during our test, such as the PCI-server or
the pipe process. Others were profiled but tH was terminated once our main processes under test
normalized and did not get a chance to see enough kernel calls during their lifetime, such as the
SSH daemon. Even though we SSH’d into the machine to run tH, there was hardly any traffic on
the network to exercise the daemon and build a profile.
As we incrementally added more traing datasets, we could see more threads normalizing as
threads that were inactive before have now become active.
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6.2.1 Using Multiple Datasets For Training
After profiling the system behavior using the three datasets, we decided to evaluate our training
methodology before putting tH through the real testing rounds and producing the final results. We
ran testing on two datasets, using the augmented training profiles. Both tests ran for four hours
each, 960 times longer than each loop iteration. Tables 4 and 5 show the results. For the first test
set, Parallax, Sensor, Screen and Intel-drm, slog2info, io-hid and io-pkt showed no anomalies for
the whole run. The Anomaly/Train Count column shows the total number of calls made during
this period; all processes’ threads have been highly active during the testing phase. However, the
Sensor process has one out of six threads showing anomalies with a total of three anomalies in
9379052 calls. The USB disk driver, devb-umass, had three anomalous threads out of 11 active
threads, with a rate of four anomalies in 56315359 calls. This comes to a total of 4/40 anomalous
thread. The second dataset shows similar results: Parallax has two out of six anomalous threads
at a rate of 0.00000166%, Sensor has two anomalous threads out of five, at a rate of 0.000035306%
and the USB disk driver has 3/11 anomalous threads with a rate of 0.005429176%. This was quite
a high percentage. We came to the quick realization that training using three datasets was not
enough: tH was not experiencing enough software behaviour and was generating a higher rate of
false-positives that we have initially anticipated.
6.2.2 Thread Pools
After carefully investigating the source code for the anomalous processes, we concluded that their
use of thread pools is the root cause of the anomalies we observed. Consider a thread pool consisting
of three threads, de-queing a queue of tasks numbered 1 through 10. At the first run, thread 1
works at 100% of the time and performs all the work. If during training, threads 2 and 3 never
performed any work or performed less work that usual, tH will build a profile for them that does
not accurately reflect their possible behavior. To account for this variation, we need to stress the
system and exercise all the threads so that we can learn all their possible behaviors. Given that the
datasets we have for training have a short duration (15 seconds each on a loop), this wasn’t made
possible even when training over multiple datasets. The use of thread pools or thread pool-like
behaving threads run in a non-deterministic behavior as a result of either thread schedule and/or
the variation in the coming workload for each thread. Since the short duration of the datasets was
a limiting factor to experiencing the software behavior in full during training on a small number
of datasets, an obvious solution was to modify the training methodology and add more datasets to
the training.
6.2.3 Stress Testing the Disk Driver
The USB disk driver, devb-umass showed the greatest number of anomalies during the initial testing
phase. Almost every single test run showed a few anomalies in a devb-umass thread. It is highly
dependent on multiple threads sharing the same work queues (thread pools). One way to exercise
all the legal behavior of all its threads is to stress test the driver. Fortunately, QNX has a series
of tools for such a task. The stress tests were run and the driver’s profiles saved. From that point
on, devb-umass showed 0 anomalies in every single preliminary test run 12.
12Preliminary test runs were executed for one hour.
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Process Name-Thread ID Anomaly/Train Count (%) Total False Positives
Parallax-0 0/7342025 (0%)
Parallax-6 0/416263 (0%)
Parallax-7 0/416222 (0%)
Parallax-8 0/416210 (0%)
Parallax-9 0/24646353 (0%)
Parallax-10 0/53123282 (0%)
Parallax-11 0/0 (NA)
Parallax-12 0/0 (NA) 0/86360355
Sensor-4 0/1681517 (0%)
Sensor-5 0/1685225 (0%)
Sensor-6 3/973325 (0%)
Sensor-7 0/2241408 (0%)
Sensor-8 0/2797577 (0%)
Sensor-9 0/2797577 (0%)
Sensor-10 0/0 (NA)
Sensor-11 0/0 (NA) 3/9379052
Screen-1 0/773724 (0%)
Screen-2 0/25059466 (0%)
Screen-7 0/276072 (0%) 0/26109262
Intel-drm-7 0/117363 (0%)
Intel-drm-14 0/25645754 (0%)
Intel-drm-15 0/0 (NA)
Intel-drm-17 0/0 (NA)
Intel-drm-18 0/28809443 (0%)
Intel-drm-19 0/22448047 (0%)
Intel-drm-20 0/26402958 (0%) 0/103423565
devb-umass-1 0/55776515 (0%)
devb-umass-2 1/795 (0.125%)
devb-umass-3 0/533095 (0%)
devb-umass-6 0/769 (0%)
devb-umass-7 3/732 (0.409%)
devb-umass-8 0/756 (0%)
devb-umass-9 0/748 (0%)
devb-umass-10 1/702 (0.142%)
devb-umass-11 0/685 (0%)
devb-umass-12 0/552 (0%)
devb-umass-13 0/10 (0%) 4/56315359
io-pkt-v6-hc 0/39 (0%) 0
slog2info 0/28745 (0%) 0
io-hid 0/552127 (0%) 0
Table 4: False positive results for testing dataset 4 - 2.9 gigabytes of sensor recordings
43
Process Name-Thread ID Anomaly/Train Count (%) Total False Positives
Parallax-0 1/6188982 (0.0000001%)
Parallax-6 0/350115 (0%)
Parallax-7 0/350117 (0%)
Parallax-8 0/350115 (0%)
Parallax-9 0/14424971 (0%)
Parallax-10 1/38584735 (0.00000002%)
Parallax-11 0/0 (NA)
Parallax-12 0/0 (NA) 1/60249035
Sensor-4 0/1681517 (0%)
Sensor-5 2/1505501 (0.000001%)
Sensor-6 3/898650 (0.00003%)
Sensor-7 0/1972340 (0%)
Sensor-8 0/2439137 (0%)
Sensor-9 0/0(NA)
Sensor-10 0/0 (NA)
Sensor-11 0/0 (NA) 3/8497145
Screen-1 0/653087(0%)
Screen-2 0/21155044 (0%)
Screen-7 0/275981(0%) 0/22084112
Intel-drm-7 0/141064 (0%)
Intel-drm-14 0/0 (NA)
Intel-drm-15 0/0 (NA)
Intel-drm-17 0/28305912 (0%)
Intel-drm-18 0/14033855 (0%)
Intel-drm-19 0/22365322 (0%)
Intel-drm-20 0/24906751 (0%) 0/89752904
devb-umass-1 0/36017(0%)
devb-umass-2 1/690 (0.144%)
devb-umass-3 0/13496 (0%)
devb-umass-6 0/695 (0%)
devb-umass-7 1/669 (0.149%)
devb-umass-8 0/749 (0%)
devb-umass-9 0/680 (0%)
devb-umass-10 1/714 (0.14%)
devb-umass-11 0/741 (0%)
devb-umass-12 0/695 (0%)
devb-umass-13 0/111 (0%) 3/55257
io-pkt-v6-hc 0/38 (0%) 0
slog2info 0/28745 (0%) 0
io-hid 0/551968 (0%) 0
Table 5: False positive results for testing dataset 5 - 0.5 gigabyte of sensor recordings
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6.2.4 The 50/50 Split
After augmenting the training with one more dataset, we re-ran the test on the same dataset we
showed in Table 5. The new testing results with the augmented training shows an improvement.
The previously anomalous threads in the disk driver, as well as the Sensor and Parallax processes,
have completely disappeared. However, new anomalies have been introduced in another Sensor
thread and an Intel-drm thread, which was previously inactive, and became more active based on
the work load and thread scheduling priorities. We concluded that indeed, adding more training
data does improve the quality of the behavioral models and reduce the false positives detected.
As a result we split our datasets into two sets at random, a set for training and another for
testing. Training was performed on datasets 1 through 7 and testing was performed on datasets 8
through 16. tH was run with all the training datasets and allowed to augment its locked profiles
with new behavior. The learning was terminated manually after 12 hours of seeing no new behavior.
The total size of the datasets was 4.8 gigabytes.
6.2.5 Testing on the Training datasets - A Quick Sanity Check
After augmenting the training with the extra datasets we ran the testing on all datasets we had
used for training for over two hours each. Initially, after learning on a dataset, running a test on the
same training dataset would still yield, on average, one or two anomalous threads with an average
of three anomalies each. We could see clearly that some threads remain inactive (0 anomalies/0
total message count) during training, then becoming active while testing the exact same dataset.
As explained previously in section 6.2.1, by design, this is due to the thread pool-like behaviour
of some threads. Different threads were being non-deterministically scheduled to handle incoming
tasks and tH was not getting the chance to observe their behavior during training. Adding more
training datasets, allowed thread pool participating threads to experience more work and thus
allow tH to learn a more complete picture of their possible behavior. As the training datasets were
incrementally added, we have seen the thread anomalies drop down to 0 anomalous threads for all
seven training datasets over a two-hour testing period. This is not to claim that we have learnt
the behavior of the thread pools in full, but rather that we have learnt enough, given our limited
training datasets’ sizes. We are now ready to start testing.
6.2.6 tH Usage Statistics
To collect CPU usage statistics, we ran top and sampled tH’s CPU usage. tH uses on average,
1.12% of the CPU and 4.5 MBs of memory at runtime (stack and heap space). The save disk
profiles had a total size of 17.7 KB. This is quite a small footprint for such a complex system.
6.2.7 Process Normalization Results
Table 6 shows a summary of the number of threads that normalized per-process along with their
average and maximum normalization times. There was an error in calculating the normalization
times in two of the intel-drm’s threads and their data was excluded. On average, all active threads
in the main processes (Parallax, Sensor, Screen, Intel-drm) normalized in 1.8 hours. The thread
with the highest normalization time took 13 hours, an outlier compared to the rest of the threads.
Initially, some threads did not normalize during training on the first and main training dataset
but normalized later while augmenting the training with the extra datasets as described in Section
6.2.1. In addition, some threads were not active during training, for example, Parallax’s main
thread or idle threads that are part of a thread pool and did not get a chance to execute. As
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Process Normal (active) Avg. Time Max Time Avg. Msg Msg
Name /Total Threads to Normal to Normal Count /Second
Parallax 8/11 7972 19190 357577012 18633
Sensor 7/10 9744 46482 37964068 3896
Screen 4/14 3724.5 4091 262041049 70356
Intel-drm 10/21 3474 5353 243709074 70152
devb-umass 13/13 7587 23007 115235735 1189
io-pkt-v6-hc 1/5 70936 70936 19133 0.29
slog2info 1/1 3708 3708 762018 205
io-hid 1/6 3602 3602 14688381 4077
Table 6: Normalization statistics
Process Avg. Normalization
Name in Seconds
Parallax 31040
Sensor 3603
Screen 3611
Intel-drm 10922
devb-umass 55119
io-pkt-v6-hc 27061
slog2info 3619
io-hid 3602
Table 7: Normalization statistics for the per-process profiling method
a result, there is a lack of full thread normalization count (the Normal/Total Threads column).
The per-thread process normalization times are shown in the Appendix 13. The total number of
threads in the processes under test is 81 (active and non-active) out of which 45 where active.
100% of all active threads in the system normalized (45 threads). The data shows that Intel-drm
sent 70,152 messages per second, the rate of messages sent during the training period, followed by
Screen, Parallax, devb-umass and then Sensor in descending order of message rates.
Table 7 shows the normalization data per profile. As expected, the time taken to normalize
with the per-profile method was much lower. The profile sees the data from all the different threads
and combines them into one profile. The data rate for the entire process is much higher than its
per-thread counterpart and thus tH freezes and normalizes much faster. As well, the compact
model has more permutations from all the thread system calls and is less likely to detect that a
sequence is anomalous (as we’ll prove later). This decreases the likelihood of a process to thaw
after it has been frozen.
It is important to realize that there is a single in-kernel trace data buffer, therefore the fact that
we’re monitoring the entire system greatly affects the time taken to normalize. What is important
and should remain constant, is the number of events taken to normalize. We have implemented
an additional feature that allows tH to instruct the kernel to monitor the Parallax process only.
This way, there would be no other trace data generated except for Parallax’s. Running tH with
this configuration showed normalization times that are slightly less and on average have the same
number of events generated before a process normalizes.
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6.3 The Testing Phase
tH’s ability to profile software behavior is highly dependent on whether it will think of normal data
as anomalous or benign. The testing sets are high-resolution recordings of several sensor input
data of the autonomous vehicle driving at different locations. The total size of the test data was
4.8 gigabytes for a maximum of 15 seconds of driving (a minimum of 5). All the tests ran in a
continuous loop for exactly 12 hours. A script was developed to start and terminate the tests.
Ideally, tH would have been trained well enough and would not find any mismatches in the system
call sequences. Running the test for 12 hours each was not an arbitrary decision. We initially
started running the tests for over 24 hours and noticed that in all the runs, we were not recording
any new anomalies past the 3 hour run-time. In addition, it was not feasible to run all these
tests for a longer period of time due to time constraints. Running the tests for longer shows less
false positive rates as the number of messages keep increasing and the anomalies generated remain
constant.
The tests were run remotely via a secure remote terminal (SSH) into the embedded system over
the intranet. Hence the inclusion of the io-pkt, the network drive, in our results.
Table 8 shows the results per testing dataset. The first column in the table is a combination
of the process name and thread ID, followed by the number of anomalies reported out of the total
calls seen during testing. The last column shows the average false-positives for the entire process.
Table 9 shows the summary of the results.
The total number of tested running threads is 45. All the threads in the core processes (Paral-
lax, Sensor, and Screen), showed zero anomalies in all the test runs. The GPU driver, drm-Intel
showed anomalies in two of the six datasets: both anomalies appeared in thread 21 (1/45 threads),
1/186,878,492 (0.000000535%) and 2/195,985,082 (0.00000102 %) anomalies. The USB flash driver
showed anomalies in three of the six datasets: in two datasets, thread 4 (1/45 threads), 3/2315
(0.129589633%) and 2/66i (3.03030303%) anomalies and in the other dataset, threads 4 and 21
(2/45 threads) showed 1/71 (1.408450704%) and 1/1444 (0.069252078%) anomalies respectively.
The other support processes such as io-okt, slog2info and io-hid showed no anomalies in all six
datasets.
Process - Set Set Set Set Set Set
Thread ID 1 2 3 4 5 6
Parallax-0 0/33812744 0/23949869 0/14236830 0/33812322 0/33281734 0/35395620
Parallax-6 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1058102 0/1000216 0/1076343
Parallax-7 0/962748 0/1090750 0/1057923 0/967162 0/881667 0/940404
Parallax-8 0/854818 0/967274 0/898050 0/937632 0/848803 0/909797
Parallax-9 0/831194 0/931742 0/839093 0/22114515 0/26658432 0/31374106
Parallax-10 0/37921481 0/31912732 0/18644677 0/98737722 0/92637253 0/103117400
Parallax-11 0/86724565 0/97495376 0/74821427 0/0 0/0 0/0
Parallax-12 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
Total % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Sensor-4 0/4752335 0/5037517 0/4865351 0/4812122 0/4762835 0/5024051
Sensor-5 0/4782273 0/5037517 0/4854295 0/4812122 0/4796520 0/5035120
Sensor-6 0/2930950 0/2929943 0/2932986 0/17843295 0/17612668 0/18533258
Sensor-7 0/17976442 0/6753514 0/1727998 0/15520688 0/15247503 0/16113234
Sensor-8 0/15554401 0/8433901 0/1728123 0/2312811 0/2326762 0/2370077
Sensor-9 0/2317209 0/3402894 0/3402435 0/0 0/0 0/0
Sensor-10 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
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Total % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Screen-1 0/1162670585 0/950560598 0/525434677 0/1406358189 0/1258094712 0/914563944
Screen-2 0/57460340 0/65387103 0/57329720 0/63350821 0/59402457 0/64231233
Screen-6 0/834574 0/835745 0/835865 0/837104 0/836297 0/833634
Screen-7 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
Total % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Intel-drm-6 0/489132 0/497661 0/479823 0/535294 0/513495 0/460392
Intel-drm-7 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
Intel-drm-14 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
Intel-drm-15 0/0 0/0 0/13066559 0/0 0/0 0/0
Intel-drm-16 0/33930946 0/35469330 0/29320667 0/34288888 0/31343971 0/37341598
Intel-drm-17 0/31299497 0/36844188 0/31406731 0/34851092 0/33176156 0/38257197
Intel-drm-18 0/32759761 0/34380182 0/32782650 0/35443673 0/31070878 0/30335954
Intel-drm-19 0/31920048 0/35005735 0/30326565 0/33859799 0/32979838 0/35310895
Intel-drm-20 0/29229022 0/35312620 0/30117836 0/33361612 0/32393358 0/33681805
Intel-drm-21 1/27250086 0/33010963 2/28484251 0/33716209 0/32107750 0/31759378
Total % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
devb-umass-1 0/129514955 0/162852297 0/197252847 0/127576290 0/139912922 0/146890056
devb-umass-2 0/2320 0/2280 0/2174 0/2292 0/2246 0/4971
devb-umass-3 0/1179673 0/1518491 0/1097283 0/1109493 0/1618036 0/1300704
devb-umass-4 0/72 0/46 3/2315 0/50 2/66 1/71
devb-umass-6 0/2225 0/2312 0/2217 0/2366 0/2343 0/2333
devb-umass-7 0/2288 0/2297 0/2189 0/2304 0/2250 0/2361
devb-umass-8 0/2153 0/2303 0/2136 0/2268 0/2290 0/2259
devb-umass-9 0/2189 0/2087 0/2043 0/2178 0/2215 0/2221
devb-umass-10 0/2050 0/2193 0/1982 0/2144 0/2196 0/2134
devb-umass-11 0/1855 0/1989 0/1925 0/1902 0/1902 0/1918
devb-umass-12 0/1524 0/1274 0/1314 0/1420 0/1521 1/1444
devb-umass-13 0/475 0/180 0/590 0/345 0/203 0/149
devb-umass-14 0/51 0/9 0/31 0/52 0/21 0/9
Total % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
io-pkt-v6-hc 0/115 0/116 0/115 0/116 0/116 0/116
slog2info 0/85998 0/86237 0/86048 0/86443 0/86255 0/86008
io-hid 0/1669183 0/1671475 0/1671758 0/1674230 0/1672609 0/1667283
Table 8: False-positive results for all testing datasets
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Total False-Positives Per Process Per Dataset
Process 1 2 3 4 5 6
Parallax 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sensor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Screen 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intel-drm 1/186,878,492 0 2/195,985,082 0 0 0
devb-umass 0 0 3/198,369,046 0 2/141,548,211 2/148,210,630
io-pkt-v6-hc 0 0 0 0 0 0
slog2info 0 0 0 0 0 0
io-hid 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 9: Summary of the testing results over all datasets after 12 hours of repeated testing
6.4 Brief Fault Detection Tests
As mentioned before, we have not conducted an intensive investigation into the true purpose of the
anomaly detector: detecting real true-positive anomalies. We realize that this is a limitation to our
work presented here. The creation of these tests requires a careful study so that the results are not
biased in our favor and true real-world anomalies are tested. We leave this to future investigations.
However, there are some brief tests we could conduct to validate in a way the effectiveness of our
proposal. This is not conclusive in anyway, but nevertheless serves its purpose.
6.4.1 Removing a Sensor
For this test, we attempt to simulate disconnecting the right and left cameras by removing their file
from the system. After starting one of the datasets (dataset 1), the right and left camera files were
removed. As a result of interacting with the file system residing on the USB flash drive in a way that
was not experienced during learning, two threads of the USB driver showed anomalous behaviors:
thread 11 generated seven anomalies and thread 7 generated two anomalies. Immediately following
the file removal, Sensor thread 5 generated 10 anomalies as a result of not being able to read the
sensor input data (the camera files).
Another test we conducted was removing sensors from the configuration before we started the
test run. All the sensors were removed except for the first camera. After 5 minutes, the test was
terminated. Parallax’s thread 6 was showing a constant rate of anomalies to come to a total of
777254/19842367 (3.917143554%). This is an undoubtedly detectable rate.
6.4.2 Physically Interacting with the System
During training tH, we did not interact with the car system at all, we let it “drive” on its own
without any interference. Thus tH is not expecting this sort of behavior. In this test we physically
interacted with the system in order to see if tH will notice any difference in the way the system
behaves.
6.4.3 The Keyboard
Parallax supports the ability to enable and disable different views on the screen (3D object rendering
view, LiDAR view, etc.). As expected, tH did not like our interaction and deemed the system
behaviour abnormal. After one key press, Parallax’s thread 1 showed 18 anomalies. By the time
we got to the letter q, thread 1 showed 519 anomalies and slog2info’s thread 1 had 81 anomalies
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and Screen’s thread 2 had 14 anomalies. Intel-drm’s threads 16 and 17 showed three and seven
anomalies respectively.
6.4.4 The Mouse
Table 10 shows the results after connecting and moving a mouse. A constant flurry of anomalies
was generated and we terminated the test after a few seconds.
Process Anomalies Thread ID(s)
Parallax 974 0
Sensor 0 NA
Screen 1529 6
Intel-drm 6 16
devb-umass 9 10
io-pkt-v6-hc 0 NA
slog2info 0 NA
io-hid 24 1
Table 10: Summary of the anomalies generated after connecting and moving a mouse for a few
seconds
The anomalies generated for both the keyboard and mouse tests were a constant rate of anoma-
lies. For this reason, it did not make sense to show the anomaly as a percentage of the total
calls.
6.4.5 Changing the restart order
In our experience, embedded systems have a pre-defined static list of process boot order. This
list does not usually change. Part of the way tH works is by using process IDs to distinguish
between the different messages a process sends (see 5). If a process does not have the same ID,
for example via changing the restart order of processes on a system, or replacing a binary with
different one with the same name, tH would be able to identify this quickly. In this test, we changed
the boot order by starting the ssh daemon before all the other processes under test. This resulted
in Parallax, Sensor, Screen, drm-Intel, devb-umass, io-pkt, slog2info and io-hid having a different
process ID. This caused tH to generate a continuous storm of anomalies; every call from everything
was anomalous, and we had to terminate the test after a few seconds.
6.4.6 Overheating
One of our test runs generated an exceptionally high amount of anomalies. Much investigation
was performed to determine the root cause. It turns out that we erroneously disabled the CPU
fan in the BIOS settings and neglected to turn it back on. This fortunate coincidence led to a
discovery that thread behavior changes as the hardware overheats. For this test, we disabled the
CPU fan and wrapped the BeeBox in a bit of clothing to cause overheating. We then ran one
of the testing datasets with a previously zero false positive rate across all threads. The test was
terminated after 38 minutes as an excessive amount of heat was generated and we did not want to
cause permanent damage to the hardware. The results are shown in Table 6.4.6. Parallax thread 9
shows a 0.09% anomaly rate while Screen’s thread 2 had 0.02%. Intel-drm threads 16 to 21 show an
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average anomaly rate of 0.01% for 38 minutes of runtime. In addition, drm-Intel creates an extra
thread (thread 22) to deal with the slowing down GPU, which is regarded as an anomaly. The
USB disk driver had two anomalous threads (3 and 1) with 19 (0.12%) and 11 (0.0001%) anomalies
respectively.
Process-Thread ID Anomalies
Parallax-9 782/996802 (0.078450886%)
Sensor-* 0 (0%)
Screen-2 335/1910893 (0.017531071%)
Intel-drm-16 103/998486 (0.010315618%)
Intel-drm-17 65/951152 (0.006833818%)
Intel-drm-18 167/1341177 (0.012451749%)
Intel-drm-19 119/1190857 (0.009992804%)
Intel-drm-20 59/1243944 (0.004742979%)
Intel-drm-21 60/912983 (0.006571864%)
devb-umass-1 10/9328783 (0.000107195%)
devb-umass-3 29/25087 (0.11559772%)
io-pkt-v6-hc-* 0 (0%)
slog2info-* 0 (0%)
io-hid-* 0 (0%)
Table 11: Summary of the overheating testing results after 38 minutes
7 Discussion
In this chapter we discuss the test results produced in Chapter 6. For the evaluation of our
implementation, we mainly focus on the false positives generated when testing using clean data that
is known to be normal and contains no anomalies. The true positive anomaly tests we conducted
were brief and simple and we plan to expand on them as part of future work.
7.1 Results Analysis
7.1.1 Determinism
As the results in Section 6.3 show, Parallax, Sensor, Screen and the auxiliary processes (io-pkt,
slog2info and io-hid) show no anomalies. This goes to show that all of these processes have deter-
ministic behavior and that tH was able to reliably learn what that is. We have conclusive evidence
that shows that all these processes are highly active in terms of CPU usage, as shown in Section
6.1 and the high number of issued system calls and messages sent as shown in Table 8.
Normalization results in Section 6.2.7 show an average normalization time of 1.8 hours for
Parallax, Sensor, Screen and Intel-drm. This is another indicator of behavioral determinism in the
threads under test. In comparison, when we attempted to profile a QNX port of a web browser
(based on Google Blink), the average normalization time for the normalized threads was orders of
magnitude larger. Clearly, a web browser is a software not intended to perform a critical function
and we did not expect it to have the same level of behavioral determinism.
To gain further insight, we collected extra runtime data. If the distinct messages communicated
between processes had high variance, there was no hope that we could have profiled its behavior
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and detected anomalies. Consider a thread that sends thousands of different types of messages at
random times. Profiling its behavior using short sequences of message headers would not yield great
results; it would take a very long time to build a profile of all possible sequences. Such a profile
would then be useless while testing for anomalies, since all possible sequences are permissible.
Table 12 shows the number of distinct kernel calls each process makes, followed by the distinct
message header types sent to processes other than the process manager (non-kernel calls). The
final column is the number of system processes each process communicates with, apart from the
process manager.
The average unique kernel call types is 2 and the average unique non-kernel call message type is
1.78. This confirms that using the 16-bit message header for profiling the message sequence could
potentially be a valid choice since the variance in unique message types is very low. Table 16 has
details of the collected data including the list of the different messages sent, the process indexes,
the channel ID, and the node ID they are sent to, along with the count for each of them.
The data also shows that processes are highly connected. On average, the number of sys-
tem processes each process communicated with is 2.2 (maximum of 7), this is not surprising in a
non-monolithic system with a microkernel architecture. All drivers and processes are highly com-
municating system processes that rely on sending messages to perform their core functions. A
perturbation in the communication between them could be a powerful indicator of anomalies.
Process Distinct Distinct Communicating
Name Kernel Calls (%) Non-Kernel Calls (%) Processes
Parallax 2 (28.5%) 5 (71.5%) 4
Sensor 3 (42.8%) 4 (57.2%) 2
Screen 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 3
Intel-drm 7 (100%) 0 (0%) 0
devb-umass 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 7
io-pkt-v6-hc 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 2
devc-pty 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0
slog2info 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 1
io-hid 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 1
Table 12: Process Connectivity Data
7.1.2 The False Positives
As discussed in section 6.3, the GPU and USB drivers show one anomalous thread on average in a
few datasets. After further investigation, we concluded the three main reasons for such anomalies
are: thread pools, overheating, and using a low quality USB flash drive.
7.1.3 Thread Pools
Most of the processes under test create two different types of threads. The first type is single-tasked
threads, or threads that only have one type of job to do. These threads always show deterministic
behavior and have 0% false-positives. The second type is multi-tasked threads; much like thread
pools, they process a queue of incoming requests. These requests can vary in nature and cause the
threads to behave differently according to the task being handled. A simple display of the running
threads from the command prompt shows thread names that indicate they are part of a thread
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pool to process requests. Listing 4 shows a snippet of such output. Given that the work load per
queued task varies and that the thread scheduling is up to the operating system, the behavior of a
thread that is part of a thread pool becomes less deterministic. The thread’s workload or the types
of tasks it performs will vary every time the software is run. This can be easily observed from the
total count of messages each process emits. Table 8 shows the different total message counts seen
by every thread and how they radically differ. Parallax thread 6 was completely dormant in the
first three datasets and then became active while running the other three datasets. Thread 9 in
the Sensor process was very active in the first three datasets and had no activity during testing of
the last three datasets.
Due to the thread work load varying on every run, we hypothesized that this was the main
reason as to why the threads in drm-Intel and devb-umass show anomalies. Devb-umass thread 21
clearly named regmgr thread pool, confirming our theory that it is indeed part of a thread pool.
This is not a problem, as tH can be easily modified to handle threads pools in two different ways:
1. By training over more radically different datasets. As we have shown in Section 6.2.5, adding
more training sets to the system enhances the profiling capability. Ideally, over-stressing the
system in such a way that all threads that are part of a thread pool are over loaded and
experience all practically possible types of requests in all possible orders. In practice, it is not
unlikely to see safety-critical systems exhaustively tested to their limits in such a way that
all software behavior is exhibited. As a matter of fact, we were able to obtain some of the
stress tests that QNX performs on USB disk driver (devb-umass) and use them for training
as described in Section 6.2.3. As a result, we have seen less anomalies reported by any of the
USB disk driver’s threads. The training datasets we have obtained, even though they amount
to a total of 7.5 gigabytes, are still limited. Each test is roughly 15 seconds in length, hardly
giving tH the chance to experience the full system behavior. A future endeavour would be to
deploy tH on one of QNX’s self-driving vehicles and training would occur continuously while
driving around, for extended periods of time. We believe this would yield a much better
training experience and a more realistic training environment. The training datasets we used
are as close to reality as we could possibly get but are not as close as we would have hoped.
2. By naming process threads accordingly and having tH use thread names as identifiers of thread
types. Listing 4 shows the output of a shell command display the thread names of all sys-
tem processes. As can be seen from the thread names, most of the processes under test
have a thread pool or thread pool like implementation: Sensor’s SensorRegMgr threads,
Screen’s screen-msg threads and drm-intel’s resmgr thread pool threads. A code inspec-
tion of Parallax also shows that the unnamed threads are part of a thread pool. For a future
implementation, we propose that all single-tasked threads in the process are uniquely named.
Threads belonging to a thread pool or ones that are intended to be used in parallel with
other identical threads performing the same tasks should either be named similarly or left
unnamed. This would allow tH to recognize these threads and build a single profile for
all the threads belonging to a pool and a profile per thread for all other threads in the
process. This way, the behavior of these threads is regarded as one; similar to the original
pH’s single per-process profile but for a specific thread subset. Such a change would be trivial
to implement in tH and would reduce the need to try and learn all possible permutations of
behavior that a thread can experience. Figure 15 depicts a representation of this concept.
# pid in threads
root : / $ p id in threads
pid t i d name thread name
8200 1 oc/boot/devb−umass xp t s i gna l h and l e r
8200 2 oc/boot/devb−umass USBdi event handler
8200 3 oc/boot/devb−umass f sy s r e smgr
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Figure 15: Proposed per-thread pool profile.
8200 4 oc/boot/devb−umass umass dr ive r thread
8200 5 oc/boot/devb−umass a sync i o
8200 6 oc/boot/devb−umass f s n o t i f y t h r e a d
8200 7 oc/boot/devb−umass f sy s r e smgr
8200 8 oc/boot/devb−umass f sy s r e smgr
8200 9 oc/boot/devb−umass f sy s r e smgr
8200 10 oc/boot/devb−umass f sy s r e smgr
8200 12 oc/boot/devb−umass f sy s r e smgr
8200 13 oc/boot/devb−umass f sy s r e smgr
241689 1 sb in / sc r een screen−monitor
241689 2 sb in / sc r een drm−event−handler
241689 3 sb in / sc r een screen−dpy−3
241689 4 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 5 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 6 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 7 sb in / sc r een screen−hid
241689 8 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 9 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 10 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 12 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 13 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 14 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
241689 15 sb in / sc r een screen−msg
245786 1 sb in /drm−i n t e l drm−monitor
245786 2 sb in /drm−i n t e l k e rne l t imer
245786 3 sb in /drm−i n t e l system wq
245786 4 sb in /drm−i n t e l system unbound wq
245786 5 sb in /drm−i n t e l system long wq
245786 6 sb in /drm−i n t e l t a s k l e t wq
245786 7 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915
245786 8 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915−dp
245786 9 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915−i s r
245786 10 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915 modeset
245786 11 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915−userptr−acqu i r e
245786 12 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915 / s i g n a l : 0
245786 13 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915 / s i g n a l : 1
245786 14 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915 / s i g n a l : 2
245786 15 sb in /drm−i n t e l i915 / s i g n a l : 4
245786 16 sb in /drm−i n t e l r e smgr thread poo l
245786 17 sb in /drm−i n t e l r e smgr thread poo l
245786 19 sb in /drm−i n t e l r e smgr thread poo l
245786 20 sb in /drm−i n t e l r e smgr thread poo l
245786 21 sb in /drm−i n t e l r e smgr thread poo l
245786 22 sb in /drm−i n t e l r e smgr thread poo l
274460 1 sensor Senso rSe rv i c e
274460 2 sensor SensorResMgr
274460 3 sensor SensorResMgr
274460 4 sensor SensorResMgr
274460 5 sensor 5
274460 6 sensor 6
274460 7 sensor 7
274460 8 sensor 8
274460 9 sensor 9
274460 10 sensor SensorResMgr
286749 1 Para l l ax Main
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286749 2 Para l l ax 2
286749 3 Para l l ax 3
286749 4 Para l l ax 4
286749 5 Para l l ax 5
286749 6 Para l l ax 6
286749 7 Para l l ax Camera
286749 8 Para l l ax Ana lys i s
286749 9 Para l l ax Hud
286749 10 Para l l ax 10
286749 11 Para l l ax Algo
Listing 4: Output of process thread names.
7.1.4 Overheating and High Sensitivity
As the overheating test in section 6.4.6 show; tH is sensitive to fluctuations in the heat produced
by the hardware, in particular when the hardware (GPU, USB flash drive) overheats. Given the
high throughput of data continuously being processed for 12 hours, it is not surprising for the
hardware to overheat. As well, the QNX threads, and in particular the ones belonging to the
flash drive and the GPU, react appropriately when they experience slowdowns as a result of their
respective hardware behaving differently. One could argue that tH is overly-sensitive, predicting a
problematically high false positive rate in the field. To this we argue, i) embedded safety-critical
systems must be tested to their limit, including any behavior resulting from acceptable levels of
overheating. Such behavior would thus be learnt during the training phase. Abnormal behavior
resulting from the acceptable overheating thresholds being crossed is perfectly acceptable. We
claim that sensitivity to behavioral disturbances as a result of overheating is a desired feature when
it comes to safety-critical systems, ii) our plan to create thread-pools as mentioned in Section 15
might reduce this sensitivity since all threads would be contributing to a single thread profile. This
is a reduction in sensitivity that we are not sure is desired. This needs to be investigated and
tested further after the single profile for all thread pools are implemented. Only then could an
appropriate decision be made. One potential solution is to provide the single thread-pool profile as
a configurable option. That way, drivers that deal with hardware could have this feature disabled
to remain highly sensitive to overheating or other unpredictable hardware fluctuations and disabled
for others where appropriate.
7.1.5 Low Quality USB Flash Drive
Similar to the behavior change seen as a result of overheating, the USB flash driver we used for
our experiments was a low quality USB 2.0 flash driver. As the USB driver experiences slowdowns
in the transfer rates of the flash driver, they reorganize themselves and behave differently in order
to deal with the slowdowns they’re experiencing. Migrating the data to the onboard NVMe drive
and rerunning one of the datasets that showed anomalies in the USB flash drive eliminated the
anomalies. For future work, all of our testing data will be moved to the highly performing NVMe
drive.
7.2 True Positive Tests
Even though the true-positive tests we ran were non-exhaustive and incomplete, the results of the
few tests we ran were positive. All the tests show a perturbation in the learnt normal behavior when
an unknown and previously unseen event occurs. A particularly interesting result is the activation
of anomalies in io-hid, the human-interface device driver responsible for handling the keyboard and
mouse, when the mouse and keyboard are plugged and unplugged then used. The anomalies could
be seen over almost the entire network including slog2info, the error and status logging service.
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This supports our hypothesis that viewing the system as a network of threads has more power in
detecting anomalies over isolating specific components. The network anomaly has a much lower
threshold and provides a higher confidence in true anomalies being classified. The Sensor and the
network drivers generate no anomalies when moving the mouse, however. Even though this is not
conclusive, it provides some evidence that the system is not overly sensitive. This is because Sensor
and the network driver have nothing to do with the mouse movement and thus were not disturbed.
The overheating test results in Section 6.4.6 show an unprecedented amount of anomalies. Without
doubt, the behavior of the threads does change as the hardware overheats as discussed in Section
7.1.4.
7.3 Limitations
7.3.1 Limitations of Our Testing Approach
One of the limitations we had during the learning phase was the short duration of the learning
datasets. Even though 15 seconds of driving produced 3.5 gigabytes of data, we still believe that
this was not enough to exercise all the processes’ threads in order to test a real-life driving scenario.
As shown from the testing results, this might have been enough to produce zero false positives for
the testing datasets for Parallax, Sensor and Screen, but this does not provide solid proof that the
same behavior will be produced when driving for longer periods of time while detecting anomalies.
As mentioned in Section 6.2.5, multiple datasets were added to achieve these false positive results.
Given the high volume of data generated by the various sensors and the high definition cameras, it
was infeasible to record an extended length of driving period. For future work, we intend to install
tH on a system that reads the sensor data in parallel to the original data collection methods on an
actual self-driving car and building the training profiles as the car navigates the streets.
7.3.2 The Dynamic Thread Creation
One of the issues that we will face in the future, are processes that dynamically create threads
at runtime. As a matter of fact, we have experienced threads being created as a result of the
overheating test in Section 6.4.6; drm-intel has created a new thread, thread 22 to handle the
slowing down GPU. Since we build profiles for every thread in the system, we heavily rely on thread
IDs to identify the correct thread learning structure. During learning, threads created dynamically
at runtime pose no issues; the appropriate structure will be created and assigned to their thread
ID. However, a dynamically created thread at testing time with an ID that has never been observed
during testing is regarded as an anomaly. We do not believe this behavior is incorrect. The ability
to create threads at runtime should be allowed, however, we argue that the system should be tested
to its full potential, with the maximum number of threads created. Typically, more threads are
dynamically added to a process to support a heavier workload and potentially increase parallelism.
A safety-critical system should be subjected to extreme workloads in order to test all conditions and
our training dataset was deficient in this regard. Given this exhaustive testing, dynamic thread
creation would pose no problem to tH. Further to this, the use of per-thread look-ahead pairs
table versus one table per process, allows us to easily differentiate between threads that we have
profiles for, i.e. they normalized during training, and ones that are dynamically created at runtime
and have no training profiles. This prevents newly created threads from generating false-positives,
and allows us to isolate their emergent behavior from other well-behaved threads with normalized
profiles.
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7.3.3 Detecting Internal Process Corruption
One of the limitations of our detection method is its inability to detect internal process defects
if they don’t result in a behavioral change. Monitoring a process at the system call and message
sending level does not detect or prevent corruptions within the process itself if this does not cause
any behavioral change from an outside observer’s perspective, be it in the kernel or another service.
An example would be a buffer overflow attempting to change the result of a calculation within
the process’ own address-space. However, if a vulnerability, or an error in the process were to
cause any kind of system-wide malicious activity, such as spawning a root shell, it would certainly
need to interface with the kernel by invoking system calls. Arguably, the former can potentially
have dire effects on a safety-critical system. One could also argue that an internal process defect
that does not result in a behavioral change, especially in a microservices-based architecture cannot
possibly have much consequences. Clearly, this requires further investigation. What if the defect
was internal to a driver that is the final layer in the message-chain and would then communicate
incorrectly with a device? Can an internal fault happen without any early warning signs and
behavioral changes in any other thread in the system leading to the fault? These are questions that
we will be investigating in the future.
7.4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we presented Thread Homeostasis (tH), a technique that profiles software to establish
a baseline of normal behaviour in order to identify behaviour that falls outside the norm. tH
works by efficiently modeling the behavior of process threads through the way they interact with
the underlying operating system and other services. Such a profiling technique can be a unique
identifier of how the system naturally behaves during its operation and can be used to identify
when it misbehaves. Learning how to not behave in the field could prove to be a powerful early
warning system of an occurrence of a fault or an unintended consequence. Our work is motivated
by two reasons. Firstly, engineering practices are often not adequate for developing safety critical
software. This can, and has resulted, in faults and errors going unnoticed in safety critical software.
Secondly, there is a gap in anomaly detection research for fault and error detection.
The autonomous vehicle demo software we tested had a high level of complexity and yet our
results showed that threads exhibit a fair level of behavioral determinism suitable for profiling by
tH. The results also show that profiling such behavior can be done in a matter of hours by tH.
Most of the threads under test showed zero false positives indicating that tH was able to recognize
that the threads behave similarly to its learned expectation. tH’s minimal CPU usage and memory
footprint along with these results serve as concrete evidence that tH has great potential as an online
realtime anomaly detector for faults in safety-critical systems.
Our novel and efficient approach uses inter-process message headers and system calls for building
behavioral models for every running thread on the system. This extends anomaly detection from
being limited to one or a few processes running on the system to monitoring all threads running in
a realtime microkernel message-passing operating system. The brief true positive detection tests
we conducted show the power of viewing the system as a set of interconnected threads. Leveraging
the nature of a message passing microkernel, it is much easier to see anomalies propagate and
perturb many of the system processes and threads. This provides a more confident indicator of
anomalies and reduces the threshold of the error tolerance of misclassifying a true anomaly. The
per-thread profiles provide a more sensitive behavioral model than the per-process profiles. Since
all the threads in a process conjointly update one profile, the model becomes highly dependent on
the operating system scheduling algorithm and workloads. The per-thread profiles provide freedom
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from such possible deviations in behavior.
The exhaustive level of testing and verification that a safety-critical system should be subjected
to, serves as an ultimate training ground for tH. tH could prove to be a useful tool for detecting the
incompleteness of the software’s testing and verification. Anomalies during this phase of the tests,
before the product goes operational, are a very strong indicator that there exists system behaviors
that have never been experienced before during testing and warrants an investigation.
This work has served its purpose of providing an efficient mechanism to extract the required
information out of the QNX kernel and building compact profiles for modeling system threads’
behavior. This sets the stage and lays the ground work for conducting further in-depth analysis
and research into the suitability and applicability of this method for fault tolerance in safety-critical
systems.
7.4.1 Future Work
7.4.2 More Field Evaluations
We do not consider the results in this thesis to be conclusive, however we consider them as evidence
that tH has great potential. In order to provide concrete evidence, more real-life in-field tests are
required. We intend to have tH run on QNX’s self-driving autonomous vehicle in order to learn and
detect anomalies while driving, thus experiencing more varied behaviors for an extended period of
time.
7.4.3 Eliminating Process IDs From the Training Profiles
Currently, we use the process index/ID when building the behavioral profiles (see chapter 5). This
prevents the process restart order from changing as shown in section 6.4.5. While we argued that
this is a desired behavior, having the configurable option to be able to turn this feature on or off
might be desired. In future tests, we intend to evaluate tH on more dynamic systems, such as
desktop environments running the QNX operating system. We have designed and implemented a
process index translation unit that uses process names to translate the process ID in the learnt
profile. As part of a future effort we plan to integrate this in tH. Even though the intention of this
anomaly detector is for tightly controlled, deterministic safety-critical systems that do not expect
a process restart order to change, it is nevertheless a good idea to have this module implemented
for greater flexibility and testing purposes.
7.4.4 Testing with Different Sequence Window Sizes
Currently, the window that slides over the sequence of calls during both training and testing is
of size 8 (see Chapter 5). The size of this window has a profound effect on the training models.
Imagine a hypothetical window size equal to the total number of calls emitted by a thread. This
would cause all possible permutations of all the events to be included in the model and considered
to be normal behavior, thus over generalizing. In this case, no anomalies would be detected, be
it true or false positives. On the contrary, a window size of just one would be too restrictive. A
thread must emit this exact system call sequence, otherwise, its behavior would be anomalous. For
future work, we plan to experiment with different sliding window sizes and conduct analysis on the
results. The configurable window size currently implemented in tH allows us to do this with ease.
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7.4.5 Correlating Anomalies to Source Code
A current limitation of our system is the difficulty of tracking back to the root cause of the anomalies
observed. Indeed, if an anomaly occurred, we can determine the destination and receiving threads
and the type of message sent. However, we cannot determine the location in the source code
that caused such a message or system calls. We plan to investigate the possibility of correlating
anomalies with exact source code locations.
7.4.6 Different Message Header Size
The current tH implementation only uses the 16-bit message header sent between processes (see
Section 5.9). We plan to investigate the effects of including more data from the message has on
profiling. Our expectation is that there might be too much variance in the message data, which
might render profiling difficult, if not impossible.
7.4.7 Having a Profile Per Named Thread
As discussed in Section 15, besides having a profile per thread, we plan on creating a profile
for every thread pool in the process. This aims at reducing the effects of the non-deterministic
behavior shown by thread pools that share the same tasks. This frees the profiles from dependence
on environmental factors introduced by varying workloads and thread scheduling differences.
7.4.8 Fault Injection
As part of evaluating tH’s efficiency, we plan on investigating whether tH will be able to detect
injected faults in critical software. Fault-injection testing is a research area in its own right. Setting
up and conducting the proper fault-injection tests is a topic that we intend to investigate in the
future.
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A Normalization data per-thread
Process Name-Thread ID Time Taken to Normalize (seconds) Message Count
Parallax-0 19190 204402279
Parallax-6 3603 828673725
Parallax-7 3603 8659174
Parallax-8 3603 8659174
Parallax-9 17404 8659174
Parallax-10 4830 828673725
Parallax-11 4395 144215119
Parallax-12 7148 828673725
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Sensor-4 3613 44098948
Sensor-5 3613 44072755
Sensor-6 46482 25819587
Sensor-7 3613 59425036
Sensor-8 3613 74189300
Sensor-9 3646 13631151
Sensor-10 3631 4511711
Screen-1 3602 422036776
Screen-2 4091 618783165
Screen-6 3602 2238679
Screen-7 3603 5105574
Intel-drm-6 3603 1266248
Intel-drm-7 3604 2132900
Intel-drm-14 4214 433653431
Intel-drm-15 218108 49858124
Intel-drm-16 4625 88396741
Intel-drm-17 5353 374491804
Intel-drm-18 109963 307403101
Intel-drm-19 5195 565311523
Intel-drm-20 4267 533148727
Intel-drm-21 3876 81428142
devb-umass-1 3612 1483818683
devb-umass-2 4971 20339
devb-umass-3 3869 14093250
devb-umass-4 23007 1289
devb-umass-6 6164 20089
devb-umass-7 5906 19779
devb-umass-8 6169 19782
devb-umass-9 6278 19133
devb-umass-10 5139 18627
devb-umass-11 5879 17239
devb-umass-12 5973 14659
devb-umass-13 21658 1551
devb-umass-14 588180 132
io-pkt-v6-hc 70936 19133
slog2info 3708 762018
io-hid 3602 14688381
Table 13: Process Normalization Statistics for the Process’s
Active Threads
B Unused Kernel Trace Events by tH
Trace Event Purpose
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NTO TRACE KERCALLENTER Kernel call enter trace data includes the kernel
call numbers that a thread running on a core
has generated, the core number and in case of
a MessageSend() kernel call, the data would in-
clude the connection ID (coid). Using internal
lists we built we could infer the channel, node
and process ID.
KER CONNECT ATTACH ConnectAttach() trace data, used to keep an in-
ternal list of connection IDs (coids). This al-
lows us to know the channel, node and pro-
cess ID that is attached to this coid and build
our internal lists accordingly. This is used
when NTO TRACE KERCALLENTER is re-
ceived.Note that in case we receive a connection
ID that is not in the list we would issue a kernel
call to get the information we need (because we
might have started tH after starting the process
and we might have missed the ConnectAttach()
kernel call.
KER CONNECT DETACH ConnectDetach() trace data, used to deinitial-
ize the internal structures initialized upon the
receipt of KER CONNECT ATTACH.
NTO TRACE THRUNNING Received when a thread becomes
running on a core. Used when
NTO TRACE KERCALLENTER is re-
ceived to infer which process is running of the
core.
NTO TRACE THDESTROY Used to track thread destruction. Since we have
a sequence list per-thread, it is important to de-
stroy and free the per-thread sequence in case
a new thread was created with the same thread
ID.
NTO TRACE PROCCREATE Tracks newly created processes in the system.
This is important so that we can allocate and
initialize the appropriate per-process structures.
NTO TRACE PROCCREATE NAME Supplies names of the newly created processes in
the system. This is important since the configu-
ration file for tH can specify specific binaries to
track by name. This is also important to track
the exec()s in the system.
NTO TRACE PROCDESTROY Tracks process destruction events. This is im-
portant to deinitialize and free our internal per-
process structures.
Table 14: Trace events required prior to the addition of kernel
exit trace event
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C Trace data for Google’s Blink Port on QNX
Rx Proc. Indx 16-bit Msg Head 32-bit Msg Head Count
1 (procnto)
0x0102 0x100100-00100102 1
0x0116 0x100100-00040116 232634
0x0100
0x100100-00020100 147428
0x100100-00010100 1325
0x100100-00000100 1223
0x100100-00030100 94255
0x100100-00050100 9
0x100100-00070100 48
0x0106
0x100100-00100106 588
0x100100-00100106 47069
0x0104 0x100100-00080104 47223
0x0041
0x100100-00010041 1039
0x10010000070041 22145
0x100100-00000041 175843
0x0115 0x100100-003c0115 184807
0x0110 0x100100-00180110 94140
0x0074 0x100100-00000074 97
0x0002 0x100100-00100002 1
0x0000 0x100100-00000000 6281788
0x0040 0x100100-00000040 175773
0x001a 0x100100-0001001a 6
2
0x0102 0x200100-00100102 8
0x0100 0x200100-00020100 1
3
0x0101 0x300100-00100101 8531344
0x0102 0x300100-00100102 8531507
0x0105 0x300100-00400105 19837741
8
0x0102
0x800300-00180102 11283
0x800300-00100102 313
0x0101
0x800300-00180101 2178
0x800300-00100101 332
0x0116 0x800300-00040116 2712
0x0100
0x800300-00000100 97
0x800300-00010100 110
0x800300-00020100 2667
0x0106 0x800300-00100106 11113
0x010f 0x800300-000c010f 149
0x0100
0x800300-00010100 968
0x800300-00030100 74
0x800300-00000100 879
0x800300-00040100 18
0x800300-00050100 9
0x0104 0x800300-00080104 623
0x0110 0x800300-00180110 12171
0x0119 0x800300-00080119 88
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0x010b 0x800300-000c010b 15
0x0108 0x800300-00080108 6
9 0x0101 0x900100-00100101 53429
15
0x0113
0xf00200-001c0113 476
0xf00200-00180113 290
0x0102
0xf00200-00140102 134
0xf00200-00100102 1719597
0x0101
0xf00200-00140101 6432
0xf00200-00100101 1745946
0x0105 0xf00200-00400105 1281981
0x0116 0xf00200-00040116 414
0x106
0xf00200-00100106 5154194
0xf00200-00100106 859466
0x0100 0xf00200-00020100 382
0x0115 0xf00200-003c0115 10
0x010d 0xf00200-0044010d 10
20
0x0106 0x1400100-00100106 18
0x0102 0x1400100-00100102 3421622
0x101 0x1400100-00100101 22
0x0116 0x1400100-00040116 13
0x0100
0x1400100-00020100 3
0x1400100-00010100 11
0x1400100-00000100 11
21 0x0100 0x1500100-00020100 134
27 0x0113
0x1b00400-00600113 131
0x1b00400-00100113 12652
0x1b00400-004c0113 379416
0x1b00400-00280113 458
0x1b00400-01380113 13
0x1b00400-00a80113 13
0x1b00400-00200113 39
0x1b0040-000a00113 48
0x1b00400-00480113 13
28 0x0106 0x1c0050-000100106 25907766
29
0x0102 0x1d00100-00100102 1
0x0116 0x1d00100-00040116 2
0x100 0x1d00100 - 00020100 1
0x0100 0x1d00100 - 00000100 1
Table 15: Trace data for Google’s Blink Port on QNX after
approx. 10 hours
D Normalization Details Per-Process
./Parallax
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Total calls 420329147
Total calls to normalize 243554806 (57.94%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 239620764 (57.007885%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 180708383 (42.992111%)
Num processes msg receiving 4
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 2 (28.571430%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 5 (71.428574%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x106 29 2 0 53092090 (12.63%)
0x100 1 1 0 227240164 (54.06%)
0x100 8 3 0 75693679 (18.00%)
0x106 27 5 0 41818368 (9.94%)
0x113 26 4 0 10087307 (2.39%)
0x0 1 1 0 12380600 (2.94%)
0x113 26 4 0 16939 (00.0040%)
./proc/boot/devb-umass
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 31708 (0.011081%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 286113706 (99.988922%)
Num processes msg receiving 7
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 3 (75.000000%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 1 (25.000000%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x113 7 1 0 286113706 (99.98%)
0x41 1 1 0 15865 (0.0055%)
0x10e 1 1 0 12 (0.000000042%)
0x40 1 1 0 15831 (0.0055%)
./proc/boot/io-hid
Total calls 3091954
Total calls to normalize 7339 (0.23%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 3091954 (100.000000%)
Num processes msg receiving 1
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 0 (0.000000%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 1 (100.000000%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x113 7 1 0 3091954 (100.00%)
./proc/boot/slog2info
Total calls 158556
Total calls to normalize 398 (0.24%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 158556 (100.000000%)
Num processes msg receiving 1
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Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 0 (0.000000%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 1 (100.000000%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x101 2 1 0 158556 (100.00%)
./sbin/drm-intel
Total calls 579689879
Total calls to normalize 4035021 (0.69%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 579689879 (100.000000%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 0 (0.000000%)
Num processes msg receiving 0
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 7 (100.000000%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 0 (0.000000%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x106 1 1 0 58160861 (10.03%)
0x116 1 1 0 58160417 (10.03%)
0x47 1 1 0 114405790 (19.73%)
0x100 1 1 0 116321534 (20.06%)
0x40 1 1 0 58160567 (10.03%)
0x43 1 1 0 116320663 (20.06%)
0x41 1 1 0 58160047 (10.03%)
./sbin/screen
Total calls 150581874
Total calls to normalize 579764 (0.38%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 12842020 (8.528265%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 137739854 (91.471741%)
Num processes msg receiving 3
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 1 (25.000000%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 3 (75.000000%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x106 27 5 0 131913569 (87.60%)
0x101 27 5 0 4280285 (2.84%)
0x113 10 3 0 1546000 (1.02%)
0x0 1 1 0 12842020 (8.52%)
./sensor
Total calls 74087213
Total calls to normalize 182439 (0.24%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 360645 (0.486784%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 73726568 (99.513206%)
Num processes msg receiving 2
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 3 (42.857143%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 4 (57.142860%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x101 8 3 0 73546247 (99.26%)
0x116 8 3 0 72128 (0.09%)
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0x100 1 1 0 72130 (0.09%)
0x100 8 3 0 72128 (0.09%)
0x109 8 3 0 36065 (0.04%)
0x41 1 1 0 144257 (0.19%)
0x40 1 1 0 144258 (0.19%)
./sbin/io-pkt-v6-hc
Total calls 216
Total calls to normalize 170 (78.7%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 2 (0.925926%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 214 (99.074074%)
Num processes msg receiving 2
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 1 (50.000000%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 1 (50.000000%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x101 9 1 0 214 (99.07%)
0x40 1 1 0 2 (0.92%)
./proc/boot/devc-pty
Total calls 43
Total calls to normalize 39 (90.69%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 43 (100.000000%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 0 (0.000000%)
Num processes msg receiving 0
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 1 (100.000000%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 0 (0.000000%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x17 1 1 0 43 (100.00%)
./usr/sbin/sshd (Did not normalize)
Total calls 1067
Total calls to normalize (%)
Num Non-MsgSend calls 0 (0.000000%)
Total MsgSends to procnto 143 (13.402061%)
Total MsgSends to non-procnto 924 (86.597939%)
Num processes msg receiving
Num distinct MsgSend types to procnto 14 (29.787233%)
Num distinct MsgSends types to non-procnto 33 (70.212761%)
MSG PID CHID ND COUNT
0x102 15 2 0 134 (12.55%)
0x105 3 1 0 161 (15.08%)
0x105 15 2 0 178 (16.68%)
0x105 4 1 0 159 (14.90%)
0x101 4 1 0 96 (8.99%)
0x10d 15 2 0 2 (0.18%)
0x116 15 2 0 30 (2.81%)
0x116 3 1 0 24 (2.24%)
0x116 1 1 0 16 (1.49%)
71
0x100 1 1 0 24 (2.24%)
0x100 8 3 0 9 (0.84%)
0x109 8 3 0 4 (0.37%)
0x101 8 3 0 6 (0.56%)
0x116 8 3 0 4 (0.37%)
0x72 1 1 0 2 (0.18%)
0x101 15 2 0 32 (2.99%)
0x102 3 1 0 4 (0.37%)
0x102 1 1 0 2 (0.18%)
0x115 1 1 0 6 (0.56%)
0x115 15 2 0 4 (0.37%)
0x115 3 1 0 10 (0.93%)
0x115 4 1 0 4 (0.37%)
0x116 4 1 0 6 (0.56%)
0x100 4 1 0 1 (0.09%)
0x10d 4 1 0 1 (0.09%)
0x106 15 2 0 3 (0.28%)
0x11 1 1 0 1 (0.09%)
0x102 4 1 0 1 (0.09%)
0x115 15 2 0 8 (0.74%)
0x106 15 2 0 6 (0.56%)
0x100 1 1 0 25 (2.34%)
0x100 3 1 0 2 (0.18%)
0x10d 3 1 0 2 (0.18%)
0x100 15 2 0 2 (0.18%)
0x10d 15 2 0 2 (0.18%)
0x12 1 1 0 2 (0.18%)
0x17 1 1 0 5 (0.46%)
0x0 1 1 0 24 (2.24%)
0x115 3 1 0 5 (0.46%)
0x41 1 1 0 6 (0.56%)
0x106 8 3 0 9 (0.84%)
0x100 8 3 0 11 (1.03%)
0x71 1 1 0 4 (0.37%)
0x13 1 1 0 22 (2.06%)
0x40 1 1 0 4 (0.37%)
0x115 4 1 0 3 (0.28%)
0x106 4 1 0 1 (0.09%)
Table 16: Normalization details per-process
E Average False-Positive Graphs
Below are graphs of the average false-positive percentages over all datasets for each process.
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